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It is imperative for a nation to understand the most effective way to combat 
threats to its national security, and at times the best reaction to a violent atrocity could be 
diplomatic. This thesis examines the politicization process of violent non-state actors and 
the five statistical factors that contribute to the likelihood of a successful transition 
from violence to politics. These five salient factors include the occurrence of 
negotiations, the ideology of the organization, the motivations of the organization, the 
types of targets it selects to attack, and the longevity of the group. These factors are 
identified through a statistical analysis, and tested in successive chapters examining 
case studies of violent actors that have successfully politicized, are currently 
transitioning, or have failed. The objective of this thesis is to determine if the factors 
examined can be used to predict the likelihood of other violent non-state actors 
successfully transitioning to politics. Additionally, the case is made that 
“politicization” significantly reduces violence. The conclusion suggests how 
legitimate state actors that are combating violent non-state actors can gauge ripeness 
for politicization and suggests how to focus a state’s efforts in order to support either a 
political transition or facilitate a group’s collapse. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
There has been an abundance of analysis devoted to how violent non-state groups 
are formed, what motivates them, and how counterinsurgencies or state actors can 
succeed against them. There has not been as thorough an examination conducted, though, 
regarding what motivates groups to act politically rather than violently. Specifically, 
research is sparse regarding how violent organizations are encouraged or coerced to move 
toward politics in lieu of violence as the method to achieve their aims. Scholars have used 
the term “politicization” to describe the move of a violence-centric group toward political 
action; this term is used in the same manner throughout this paper.1 By examining violent 
organizations’ underlying motivations, the trends regarding how violent groups transition 
to politics, commonalities regarding the environments in which they exist, and the 
likelihood of politicization can be ascertained. The conditions that favor a violent non-
state actor’s transition to political action could, and should, be considered and utilized to 
the United States’ advantage when determining how to deal with such a group. 
Over the last century, there has been an increase in the success rate of extremist 
organizations and terrorism as a way of achieving political ends.2 At its core, terrorism is 
an attempt to gain power and exert influence over legitimate governments in an effort to 
achieve objectives.3 Put a different way, “the central question” this analysis deals with is 
what “is the relation[ship] between terrorism and political legitimacy?”4 By combating 
terrorism via military action, democracies often legitimize the violent non-state actors 
through conflict. Acts of terror serve as a method to achieve short-term aims, but often do 
not set the conditions to fulfill long-term political interests. If an organization’s ultimate 
goal is “legitimization,” more study needs to be devoted to why violent extremist 
                                                 
1 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida, 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 19. 
2 Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the 
Present, (New York: Liveright, 2013), 559. 
3 Irving Louis Horowitz, “The Routinization of Terrorism,” Terrorism Legitimacy, and Power, ed. by 
Martha Crenshaw, (Middleton, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), 46. 
4 Martha Crenshaw, “Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts,” Terrorism in Context, 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 7. 
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organizations politicize in lieu of violent means of recognition. More specifically, this 
analysis addresses a research gap regarding how states may create conditions to 
encourage, coerce, or incentivize violent non-state actors to move toward politics, or 
“politicize,” in lieu of violence in order to achieve their aims. The act of terrorism against 
a state is, at its heart, a desperate attempt to communicate a political message. It is an 
attempt to gain power, and terrorists are ultimately engaged in a “search for 
legitimization, an attempt to move up the ladder.”5 The study of how and why violent 
non-state actors politicize is an important topic, but its conditions are rarely covered. 
Further insight into the trends associated with a violent non-state actor’s ending will be 
valuable in determining U.S. policy and future relations with these organizations. 
There are several historical examples of violent non-state actors that have 
achieved legitimacy and realized enduring goals through a transition from terror to 
political representation. Significantly, organizations that politicize tend to either fail or 
become moderate in order to gain a wider base of support. This analysis compares violent 
organizations that have successfully politicized to those that have failed to transition, and 
determines commonalities and differences that could influence current violent non-state 
actors to quell violence in an effort to gain political legitimacy. In addition, regardless of 
a group’s overall propensity to politicize, the factors that contribute to politicization are 
worthy of additional research because they may also indicate the likelihood of a group 
ending via other means as well. This illuminates ways to transition violent non-state 
organizations peacefully. 
This analysis examined eight factors with respect to an organization’s ending and 
found that five were relevant to politicization: negotiations, ideology, motivations, target 
selection, and longevity. This shows that the decision to engage in politics in lieu of 
violent insurgency is most likely to occur when certain factors are present. The factors 
found to influence politicization the most drastically are negotiations occurring, and 
attacking government-related targets more than civilian-related ones. Although, not 
significant, a violent non-state actor being right- or left-wing ideologically inspired; 
                                                 
5 Horowitz, “The Routinization of Terrorism,” 46. 
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territorially, policy, or regime-change motivated; and having demonstrated longevity are 
also found to contribute to successful political transitions. Additionally, this analysis 
examined four case studies, one successful transition to politics, two in transition, and 
one failure. These case studies validate the statistical findings and demonstrate that there 
is a reduction in violence following an organization’s politicization. A group’s 
politicization is defined by this analysis as the first time an organization actively 
participates in the political apparatus of its host nation. While a violent non-state actor’s 
shift from violence to politics often takes years to fully materialize, the moment of 
“politicization” marks a significant point in that transition. By examining violence levels 
before politicization and after, this analysis reveals a critical shift in focus and activity 
within a violent non-state actor organization. This further validates the importance of 
evaluating organizations based upon the factors that influence a group’s transition to 
politics; there is a notable reduction in violence following politicization. 
 
There are two things that a democratic people will always find very 
difficult, to begin a war and to end it. 
—Alexis de Tocqueville, 1840 
 
In 2003, United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked, “Are we 
winning or losing the Global War on Terror?” He continued, “Does the U.S. need to 
fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The U.S. is 
putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of 
effort into trying to stop terrorists.”6 His questions and assertions reflect the amount of 
study that has been dedicated to finding ways to fight terrorism, as opposed to the amount 
of study applied to preventing terrorism through non-violent means. 
Scholars predominantly agree that violence-oriented organizations begin with 
political objectives and, this analysis contends, with proper negotiations, can end in the 
                                                 
6 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, “Global War on Terrorism,” memorandum to General 
Richard B. Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, General Peter Pace, and Douglas J. Feith, October 16, 2003. 
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same manner.7 Despite the negative connotations associated with the term “terrorism,” it 
is centrally a means of political expression by those without other means. Martha 
Crenshaw, an internationally renowned terrorism expert, specifically argues that 
“terrorism [is] a form of political behavior resulting from the deliberate choice of a 
basically rational actor, the terrorist organization.”8 Campaigns of violence rely on 
rational political choice and influence.9 To the extent that an organization is logical, 
“terrorism is the result of that organization’s decision that it is a politically useful means 
to oppose a government…[and a] logical means to advance desired ends.”10 This 
assertion regarding a violent organization’s political aspirations at their inception is an 
important one with regard to how they may end. Violent activity is therefore the logical 
means of gaining recognition when the power ratio is lopsided; it has potentially high 
rewards with relatively inexpensive and simple means.11 These widely acknowledged 
political beginnings suggest the potential for political endings. 
This analysis examined the internal and external factors that affect politicization’s 
outcome. Statistically, certain combinations of internal and external factors yield similar 
results and could be used to predict or influence the outcome of a violent non-state actor. 
Different scholars have addressed these contributing conditions and the trends associated 
with violent non-state actors’ politicization in different ways. Some have examined the 
currents trends, such as the rise of religious violent non-state actors.12 Others have 
                                                 
7 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 385; 
Leonard Weinberg, “Turning to Terror: The Conditions under Which Political Parties Turn to Terrorist 
Activities,” Comparative Politics 23, no. 4 (July 199): 423; Michael Stohl, The Politics of Terrorism, 3rd 
ed., (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1988), 3; Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the 
Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 7. 
8 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 380. 
9 Ibid., 385. 
10 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 385; Weinberg, “Turning to Terror,” 423; Stohl, The 
Politics of Terrorism, 3; Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 7. 
11 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 387. 
12 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” Anthropoetics 
(University of California Los Angeles) 8, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2002); Nijab Ghadbian, “Political Islam 
and Violence,” New Political Science 22, no. 1 (2000), 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713687889#.VITF3UttEds. 
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focused on the internal factors related to violent non-state actors.13 Lastly, some scholars 
have concentrated on external factors.14 This analysis demonstrates trends associated 
with both internal and external factors as they relate to violence-centric organizations 
moving toward politics. 
For example, the data surrounding the external factor of negotiations is extremely 
revealing; it indicates that after five or six years of a violent actor’s existence, entering 
into talks often facilitates decline.15 Audrey Cronin explains that, “there is a direct 
correlation between the age of groups and the probability of talks, but…only about one in 
five groups of any age have entered into talks on strategic issues.”16 The majority of the 
time negotiations alone will not yield resolution or a complete end to violence. 
Additionally, roughly half of terrorist groups that enter into talks do not cease violence 
during negotiations.17 Concessions do not cause increases in violence either. In fact, quite 
the opposite occurs; the levels of violence tend to decline once negotiations begin.18 Only 
one in ten of these talks fail once they have started.19 So, if a state is able to bring a 
terrorist organization to the negotiating table, there is a high likelihood of being able to 
encourage a move toward political action. Therefore, from a government’s perspective, it 
becomes beneficial to negotiate with a violent group when they have demonstrated 
longevity and are “gaining popular support or legitimacy either through the actions of the 
group or clumsy counteractions by the government.”20 These “negotiations” can take 
place either directly or indirectly. For example, negotiations sometimes take place via 
                                                 
13 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism;” Cronin, How Terrorism Ends; Martha Crenshaw, “Thoughts 
on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts,” Terrorism in Context, ed. by Martha Crenshaw, (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); Max Abrams, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” 
International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006). 
14 Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-measures, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982); Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of 
Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006); Horowitz, “The Routinization of Terrorism.” 
15 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 35. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 36. 
18 Ibid., 39. 
19 Ibid., 41. 
20 Ibid., 39. 
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mass media announcements or through the state or terrorist actions.21 This leaves the 
body of knowledge regarding negotiation’s impact on politicization somewhat 
ambiguous. 
A RAND Corporation study in 2008 examined both internal and external factors 
associated with violent groups’ endings. Utilizing the National Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) database, which began noting all terrorist activity 
starting in 1968, the study covered all active and formerly active terrorist groups and 
determined the different methods of a violent group’s termination. They found that of the 
648 groups examined, approximately 43 percent of those no longer active ended through 
politicization.22 Of the four different results (military force, victory, policing, and 
politicization), politicization was the largest percentile (Figure 1). When taken as an 
aggregate, however, the numbers seem much less impressive. Using the same data, 
George Mason University’s International Security Program director Audrey Kurth Cronin 
asserts that since 1968 only about 18 percent of terrorist groups have negotiated, let alone 










                                                 
21 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 37. 
22 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 19. 
23 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 40. 
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Figure 1.  How Terrorist Groups End 
 
Source: Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for 
Countering al Qa’ida, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 19. 
Similarly, Max Abrams, a political science professor at Northeastern University, 
identifies a significant internal factor that illuminates an organizations propensity to 
politicize. By classifying terrorist groups by target selection, a notable trend emerges: 
terrorists who attack “military” and “diplomatic” targets more than “civilian” ones 
account for all the successful cases of political coercion.24 This is a remarkably 
significant trend that warrants further examination. This one internal target discrimination 
factor may indicate that a group is ripe for transition to political action. 
Notably, the “trend” of terrorism as a method of coercion seems to be on the rise. 
The perception of terrorism has been different at different points in history. Cronin 
asserts that during the, “twentieth century there developed a conviction that terrorism was 
                                                 
24 Abrams, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” 55. 
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a promising method of popular resistance to the nation state and a valid means of 
rectifying injustice.”25 Although democracies claim to not deal with terrorists, all 
democratic states have negotiated with terrorists at different times.26 The current shift 
toward terrorism as a means to an end, along with the necessity for legitimate states to 
deal with violent non-state actors indicate that this issue will expand in the coming years. 
The rise of the information age and mass media has had a significant impact on violent 
non-state groups’ politicization and the evolution of their means and goals. Contemporary 
terror tactics are able to exert more leverage than ever before. This suggests that restraint 
will be less likely in the future, as sensationalized terrorist attacks continue to gain 
influence.27 
Violent non-state actors recognize that they can demonstrate their political 
objectives, show their power, and potentially gain recruits through media coverage of 
attacks. The media and terrorists, therefore, have a somewhat symbiotic relationship. 
Richard Salant, former president of the CBS network, conceded this point by stating, 
“terrorism may be encouraged by broadcast coverage.”28 Grant Wardlaw advocates 
media self-regulation to prevent this conundrum. In a business-driven media 
environment, however, this seems an unlikely solution. Although his views are obviously 
politically motivated, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu contends that this is 
one of the major ways modern terrorism differs from classical terrorism.29 The intended 
objective of today’s terrorism is to gain publicity across the world, as opposed to military 
victory or demoralization of a specific opponent.30 The head of the United States State 
Department Counterterrorism division acknowledged that the rise in casualties in terrorist 
attacks was a direct result of a desire to ensure media attention.31 Terrorism has become 
                                                 
25 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 3. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, 57. 
28 Ibid., 81. 
29 Benjamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the West Can Win, (New York: Collins Publishers, 1986), 
108. 
30 Netanyahu, Terrorism, 108. 
31 Ibid., 114. 
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more than a means of political expression; with the advent of mass media and 
proliferation of information, it is now a “form of political advertising.”32 This external 
factor has had an impact on the longevity of violent actors and the techniques they utilize. 
University of California Los Angeles professor emeritus of political science 
David Rapoport makes a similar case that terrorism has evolved, and though the root 
causes for violence may remain the same, the motivations for terrorist activities tend to 
occur in waves. He theorizes that there have been four waves of terrorism: the “Anarchist 
Wave, the Anti-Colonial Wave, the New Left Wave,” and last the Religious Wave.33 
Examining the active violent extremist organizations throughout the world certainly 
supports his argument. An examination of the MIPT data on terrorism, and a simple 
probability determination of politicization, finds that violent groups with religious 
motivations almost never politicize and tend to remain active longer. So, while the lack of 
opportunity for political participation is a condition that often motivates terrorism and 
would seem to indicate political aspirations and therefore a tendency to politicize, the 
nature of terrorist goals has a substantial impact on politicization (Figure 2).34 While 
terrorist goals vary and tend to change over time, most can be categorized in one of six 
ways: status quo maintenance, “policy change, territorial change, regime change, empire, 







                                                 
32 Netanyahu, Terrorism, 108. 
33 Rapoport, “The Four Waves,” 47. 
34 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 383. 
35 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 52. 
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Figure 2.  Politicization by Violent Non-State Actor Goals 
 
Source: Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for 
Countering al Qa’ida, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 20. 
Additionally, the nature of the group’s “grievances matters [sic]; ethnically based 
terrorist campaigns can be harder to end decisively than politically based ones, because 
they often enjoy broader support among a population they seek to represent.”36 
Statistically, organizations with policy, regime, or territorial-based grievances are the 
most likely to negotiate and eventually politicize.37 Similarly, the ideology of a group can 
suggest the manner in which it might end. The religious “wave” of terrorism means that 
politicizing will become more and more difficult and the survivability of terrorist groups 
may continue to increase (Figure 3). 
                                                 
36 United States Institute of Peace, How Terrorism Ends, (Washington: 1999), 1. 
37 Brian Hanrahan and Forrest Crowell, “Politicization of Violent Extremist Organizations,” Working 
Paper, DA4410, Naval Postgraduate School, December 18, 2014, 3. 
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Figure 3.  Rising Survivability of Terrorist Groups in Relation to Religious 
Motivations 
 
Source: Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for 
Countering al Qa’ida, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 36. 
The conditions that precede the rise of violent non-state actors also provide 
insight toward ways to encourage politicizing and prevent terrorist activities. Through an 
analysis of RAND’s study one finds that left-wing, policy change-oriented terrorist 
organizations have the highest proclivity toward politicization.38 “Left-wing” is defined 
as ranging between Marxist-Leninist, environmentalist, anarchical.39 Conversely, right-
wing and religious movements tend to last longer, are less likely to politicize, and are 
more resilient. Crenshaw makes the assertion that “social myths, traditions, and habits 
permit the development of terrorism as an established political custom.”40 Traditions or 
                                                 
38 Hanrahan and Crowell, “Politicization,” 3. 
39 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 19. 
40 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 382. 
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cultures of violence in certain areas of the world do not seem predisposed to the rise of 
violent non-state actors. 
Likewise, she asserts that a government’s inability to prevent violent non-state 
actors is the most salient factor of a group’s longevity and success. This can take form in 
a variety of ways including everything from incompetent authoritative states to 
“democratic states whose desire to protect civil liberties constrains security measures.”41 
This is not a finding in RAND’s study or this analysis, however, as neither regime type 
nor economic conditions give insight to a terrorist group’s rise or tendency to politicize. 
Statistically, a violent non-state actor is the least likely to politicize if it exists in a 
restricting regime. Only 19 percent of groups that politicized have existed in a “not-free” 
regime.42 This is expected though, due to a dictatorship’s inclination to destroy 
opposition swiftly and violently. 
There is a danger of oversimplification, however, as the interpretation of the data 
can differ considerably. Definitions of politicization and interpretations of the data from 
MIPT display varying results on relevant factors associated with the transition to political 
action.43 Cronin explains that the majority of the research on the causes of terrorism are 
misleading and even counterproductive because when it comes to ending terrorism, there 
is a weak relationship between beginnings and endings.44 Motivations of terrorist groups 
tend to evolve over time, but some factors do remain salient. Specifically with respect to 
politicization, groups that are hierarchical, with strong leadership, have advantages over 
those that are decentralized.45 
An additional factor in many politicization cases is that the group perceives it is 
losing ground or that a “stalemate” has occurred.46 William Zartman’s theory of 
                                                 
41 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 383. 
42 Hanrahan and Crowell, “Politicization,” 3. 
43 Abrams, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work;” Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Historical Patterns in Ending 
Terrorism,” In Ending Terrorism: Lessons for Defeating al-Qaeda (The Adelphi Papers), (London: 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007); Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End. 
44 Cronin, “Historical Patterns,” 26. 
45 Ibid., 39. 
46 Ibid., 40. 
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“ripeness” is widely accepted as a precursor to successful negotiations, where each side 
recognizes that continuing the conflict will harm both parties.47 But ripeness is largely a 
matter of each side’s perception, and there are additional precursory predicting factors 
with respect to violent non-state actor organizations. Additional factors considered in this 
analysis beyond just a “mutually hurting stalemate” and the sense of a way out, indicate 
whether negotiations tend to succeed or not from the beginning.48 
The nature of a terrorist group’s attacks also has an effect on the likelihood of 
negotiations proceeding. For example, the presence of suicide campaigns reduces the 
chances of politicization because there is often not a readiness to live alongside each 
other as a result.49 This is supported by Abrams’ findings regarding types of terrorist 
attacks and the likelihood of political coercion.50 For the state, negotiations are a 
“durable strategic tool for managing violence, splintering the opposition and facilitating 
its long term decline.”51 
As famed Harvard professor and former White House National Security Council 
coordinator Samuel Huntington wrote, “Governments that fail to meet the basic welfare 
and economic needs of their people and suppress their liberties generate violent 
opposition to themselves and to Western governments that support them.”52 While many 
argue that the key for “reducing violence lies in addressing the political and economic 
grievances of those who resort to violence,” an examination of terrorist data trends 
demonstrates that a group’s politicization is related more closely to its evolving goals and 
certain commonalities in the environment around them.53 Statistics indicate the most 
influential factor in politicizing terrorist organizations is beginning negotiations. 
                                                 
 47 William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” International Conflict 
Resolution After the Cold War, ed. by Paul Stern and Daniel Druckman. (Washington, DC: National 
Academy Press, 2000), 228; Cronin, “Historical Patterns,” 40; Richard Haass, “Ripeness and the 
Settlement of International Disputes,” Global Politics and Strategy 30, no. 3 (1988): 232. 
48 Zartman, “Ripeness,” 230. 
49 Cronin, “Historical Patterns,” 41. 
50 Abrams, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” 55. 
51 Cronin, “Historical Patterns,” 43. 
52 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Age of Muslim Wars,” Newsweek, December 17, 2001, 48. 
53 Ghadbian, “Political Islam and Violence,” 77. 
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Moreover, there may be a way to exploit certain environmental or goal oriented trends in 
order to encourage politicization via mass media. 
Further exploration of politicization has significant implications on the United 
States’ budget-constrained and strategically restrained environment. Influencing 
politicization through negotiations with violent non-state actors that have specific goals 
and live in certain conditions could reduce violence and prevent future terrorist activities. 
Through an examination of case studies and identification of internal and external 
commonalities among violent extremist organizations that politicize, trends can be 
exploited to bring about a group’s moderation or failure. This would eventually decrease 
the international proliferation network and provide a non-violent means for dealing with 
terrorist organizations in certain environments. Democracies often legitimize terrorist 
organizations by fighting them; if they instead legitimize these groups by nationalizing 
them and giving them a political voice it would encourage an entirely different type of 
behavior and path toward political recognition and power. 
This research determined salient internal and external conditions that can predict 
the likelihood of a violent centric group’s potential transition to political action. A 
combination of certain factors increases the possibility of politicization. Those factors 
were determined through statistical analysis and tested through case studies. These 
factors reveal predispositions of violent non-state actors to politicize. The factors of 
negotiations, ideology, group goals, longevity, target type, regime type, size, and 
economic conditions were examined in order to develop a deeper understanding of the 
conditions surrounding politicization. Conducting a statistical analysis to determine 
factors that influence a transition from violence-centric strategies to political action 
assists in identifying factors that can predict a group’s likelihood of transition. 
Conversely, conditions have been identified that indicate a high likelihood of being 
unable to influence a group to politicize. In both cases, there are legitimate state-actor 
policy implications with respect to asset allocation, type, and the amount of blood and 
treasure invested to combat violent non-state actors. 
This analysis also examined politicization through case studies. Drawing on 
previous scholars’ examinations of specific violent non-state actors, this analysis 
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expounds upon the politicization factors tested through in-depth case study examples.54 
This analysis compared historical examples of successful transition to those currently in 
transition, as well as to those that have been unsuccessful, and generated additional trends 
that are useful in predicting the likelihood of future transitions. Equally, groups that are at 
varying stages of transition between violence and political action may show conditions 
predictive of their eventual outcome. This specific research is important to the overall 
study of politicization as a validation and testing of the statistical trends. 
Beginning in Chapter II, this analysis presents historic statistical patterns in the 
conditions of violent non-state actors and their manner of ending. It also narrows the field 
of factors to those that are statistically significant in predicting politicization. Following 
the statistical analysis there are four chapters that examine case studies of varying 
politicization outcomes. Chapter III examines Hizbollah as a case study of a violent non-
state actor in transition. The next chapter considers the Irish Republican Army, a case of 
politicization transition success. Chapter V examines Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a violent non-state actor in transition whose ultimate 
politicization success is in question. The last case study chapter examines a politicization 
failure, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The analysis ends with findings, 
recommendations, and conclusions. 
                                                 
54 David L Phillips, From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition, (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009); William R. Polk, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, 
Terrorism, & Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 
2007); Timothy Shanahan, The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009); Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining 
Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2014); Matthew Levitt, Hamas, 
Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006); 
Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2013); Brian Feeney, Sinn Fein: A Hundred Turbulent Years. (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2002); Augustine Richard Norton, Hezbollah, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007); Alison Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power, (London: 
Saqi Books, 2010); Abdullah Ocalan, Prison Writings III: The Road Map to Negotiations, (Cologne: 
International Initiative, 2012). 
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II. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONS 
The increasing availability of open-source event databases in the field of violent 
non-state actor attacks has allowed for the growing examination of global trends related 
to terrorism over the past four decades.55 By combining three of these databases, this 
analysis effort furthers the discussion and knowledge of trends correlated with the 
endings of violent non-state actors. Specifically, this effort statistically examines the 
internal and external factors that may affect a violent non-state actor’s transition from 
violent means to politics. Eight factors’ effects on politicization were considered, and five 
were determined to be significant. The method utilized, which are expounded upon in 
Section D of this chapter, was binomial regression with the dependent variable of 
politicization being dichotomous. For the purposes of this analysis, “politicization” is 
defined as the first time an organization decides to actively participate in a government’s 
political apparatus. 
A. DATASETS 
The three databases used in this analysis are the RAND “How Terrorist Groups 
End” dataset, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database, and Audrey Kurth Cronin’s “How 
Terrorism Ends” negotiation data.56 Each of these data sets considers different factors. 
This analysis combines these factors into one data set, “Transitions of Violent Non-state 
Actors,” to determine trends in what factors lead to a group’s tendency to end through 
political means. Although primarily focused on politicization, this analysis also 
considered other endings RAND recorded: splintering, victory, policing, or military 
force. The 2008 RAND database catalogued and studied the 648 known terrorist groups 
that existed between 1968 and 2006. During the assessment of these terrorist groups, 
RAND compared five distinct factors: peak size, strength of the group’s host country 
                                                 
55 Gary Lafree, “The Global Terrorism Database: Accomplishments and Challenges,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism 4, no. 1 (March 2010), 24, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/articles/issues/PTv4i1.pdf. 
56 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends; Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End; Global Terrorism 
Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
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economy, the host country’s level of freedom, terrorist group type, and the goals of the 
group. Of those 648 groups, 268 ended variously by way of military force (20), policing 
(107), finding a political solution (114), or through outright victory (27).57 As seen in 
Figure 1, 43 percent, or 114 of those 268 groups, found a political solution.58 The 
remaining 380 groups had not ended at the time of the study. 
B. DATASET FACTORS 
Eight factors were analyzed in “Transitions of Violent Non-state Actors:” 
economy, regime type, peak size of the organization, group ideology, group goals, 
lifespan, whether negotiations occurred, and a group’s predominant target type. Each 
factor was considered with respect to ending type with specific attention paid to 
politicization. The majority of these factors came from the RAND database. RAND’s 
definitions of these independent factors as defined by each dataset utilized (a–d) are 
explained in Figure 4. The ending types considered are again listed (e) in Figure 4. 
Figure 4.  Factor Definitions 
 
Source: Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for 
Countering al Qa’ida, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), 141. 
                                                 
57 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 19. 
58 Ibid..  
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Economy—For the factor of economy the World Bank classifications for gross 
national income per capita were used for the country that each group primarily operated 
in. This analysis scaled the World Bank classifications from 0 to 3 for low income, lower 
middle income, upper middle income, and high income respectively. This factor 
determines if the economic condition of the country a violent non-state actor exists in has 
bearing upon the way that group may end. The factors c, d, and e were each coded as 
ordinal factors. 
Regime Type—The factor of regime type was coded based upon the Freedom 
House classifications for the country that each group primarily operated in. The Freedom 
House scale is based upon political rights and civil liberty ratings. For this analysis, it 
was coded 0 to 2 for not free, partly free, and free respectively. This factor helped 
analyze how much impact the type of government has upon the way a group ends. 
Peak Size—The peak size of an organization was coded based upon the largest an 
organization was ever estimated or known to be. For a size of 0 to 99, 10 was used. For a 
size of 100 to 999, 100 was used. For a size of 1,000 to 9,999, 1,000 was used. Lastly, for 
an organization estimated at 10,000 personnel or larger, 10,000 was used. This factor 
indicated if the size of an organization has bearing upon the manner in which it ends. 
Ideology—Violent non-state actors were categorized into one of four different 
ideological groups. Each group was considered religious, nationalist, left-wing, or right-
wing. This analysis coded each ideology as a binary factor. Every organization was given 
either a 0 or 1 for each ideology. The analysis indicated if certain ideologies are more 
susceptible to certain endings than others. 
Goals—Similarly, the factor of goals was also coded as a binary factor. Each 
group was classified into one of six different goal types: “regime change, territorial 
change, policy change, empire, social revolution, or status quo.”59 These group goals are 
based upon the overall objective the group hopes to achieve. For example, ISIS would be 
considered an empire-goal-oriented group because they want to establish a Caliphate. 
Meanwhile the Irish Republican Army would be considered territorial-change-motivated 
                                                 
59 Kydd, and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 52. 
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because they wanted to unite Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. This factor 
indicated how significant a group’s overall motivations are to the way that group ends. 
Lifespan—Longevity is defined as the total time of activity determined by a 
group’s first and last attack.60 This factor was taken from Audrey Cronin’s dataset on 
negotiations. The number of years an organization had existed was then entered into 
“Transitions of Violent Non-state Actors” to determine the effect a group’s longevity 
may have upon its ending type. 
Negotiations—The factor of negotiations was coded as a binary factor as well. 
Negotiation is defined as any participation in negotiations to include whether the violent 
non-state actor “engaged in any discussions with external agents.”61 Negotiation most 
commonly occurs with the government of a state in which the violent non-state actor is 
active, and it is usually over the group’s goals. “Organizations solely engaged in tactical 
negotiation such as hostage negotiations were not coded as having negotiated.”62 This 
analysis did not take into account the groups’ negotiations partners, only that negotiations 
occurred. A more in-depth look at the specifics within the negotiations is considered in 
the case study analysis. 
Target Type—This analysis used the START database to examine target 
selection. For the purposes of this study, targets were categorized as either a government-
related or civilian-related target. START categorized each attack’s target as one of 22 
different types and recorded targets/victims for each incident. “When a victim was 
attacked specifically because of his or her relationship to a particular person, such as a 
prominent figure, the target type classification reflects that motive.”63 In this analysis, 
numbers 2, 3, 4, and 7 (Table 1) were considered government-related attacks, while 
                                                 
60 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Raw Data Downloads,” How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline 
and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Data Information and Codebook, September 10, 2009. 
61 Cronin, “Raw Data Downloads.” 
62 Amber K. Lubeck, “Evaluating Conditions for Successful Negotiations with Terrorists,” Central 
European University of International Relations and European Studies, (Budapest: 2012), 57, 
http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2012/lubeck_amber.pdf. 
63 Cronin, “Raw Data Downloads.” 
 21 
everything else was deemed a civilian-related target. START’s target distinctions are 
listed in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Target Type Distinctions 
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables, August 
2014, University of Maryland, 31. 
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
This analysis assumes that the data represented in the collected databases is 
accurate and complete. This analysis did not attempt to confirm the veracity of the data. 
The databases used cover organizations from 1968–2008, so there are some organizations 
either not included or whose information regarding politicization has changed. For this 
analysis, the data was considered complete regardless of any change in status that may 
have occurred since 2008. Changes in the factors since the data was collected and the 
database constructed are taken into account in the case study analysis. 
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D. METHODS 
This analysis uses regression analysis to expand on RAND’s and Audrey Cronin’s 
previous studies to determine the influence that specific external and internal factors have 
on a group’s propensity to politicize. Further analysis assesses whether there were 
specific influences present that shaped the conditions necessary for each success or 
failure of terrorist transition to political action. Specific influences proved to be a 
significant factor among violent non-state actors that politicize, and provide some insight 
into conditions that have a greater bearing on how violent organizations end. A binomial, 
or “logistic,” regression was used throughout the analysis with the dependent variable of 
politicization being dichotomous. 
The program R was utilized to analyze the datasets and merge the above-
mentioned data. The ending type of each violent non-state actor was analyzed as the 
dependent variable while the previously described factors were analyzed as independent 
factors. Within R, there are numerous available libraries that allow you to perform any 
number of functions to analyze your data sets. Additionally, different R functions provide 
diagrams, tables, and charts that display the results of your analysis. The analysis utilized 
R to produce tables that provide the coefficients for each independent factors and its level 
of significance within the model. The R library and command VISREG was utilized to 
visualize trends in the independent factors. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curves were utilized to compare and contrast both independent and dependent variable 
accuracy and impact upon the model. In a ROC curve, the sensitivity, also known as the 
true positive rate, is plotted in comparison to the false positive rate. The area under curve 
(AUC) represents the models predictive accuracy.64 Similarly, the “Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) is a measure of the relative quality of a statistical model” and can estimate 
the quality in comparison to other models.65 
                                                 
64 Michael D. Ward, Brian D. Greenhill, and Kristen M. Bakke, “The Perils of Policy by P-Value: 
Predicting Civil Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 4, (2010), 363–75. 
65 Hirotugu Akaike, “Factor analysis and AIC,” Psychometrika 52, no. 3 (1987): 317–332. 
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E. RESULTS 
This analysis found that some of the factors tested are more relevant to 
politicization than others. This section explains each factor’s significance in regard to 
politicization and the overall model’s results with respect to ending type. 
In regard to size, regime type, and economy, there is not enough statistical 
evidence to infer a strong relationship between those factors and an organization 
politicizing. The organization goals and ideology, however, did have a strong relationship 
when a group ended via politics. Politicization with respect to ideology and goals was 
shown to have the strongest relationship (Figure 5). Additionally, there is a positive trend 
associated with politicization and negotiations and lifespan. This positive trend in 
lifespan is not significant due to its variance, however (Figure 9). 





The first factor that this analysis determined warrants further case study analysis 
was negotiations. Negotiations relationship to politicization was shown to have a strong-
positive linear relationship (Figure 6). Therefore, if an organization is offered 
negotiations by its adversary, the path to politicization is often accepted. 
Figure 6.  Politicization and Negotiations 
 
 
Ideology was also shown to have a strong relationship with politicization. 
Religious ideological-motivated groups have an extremely low chance of moving to 
political action, whereas right-wing ideological groups have the highest propensity to 
politicize; this was found to be slightly higher than left-wing ideological groups (Figure 
7). Nationalist ideological groups tend to have a low propensity to politicize. 
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Figure 7.  Politicization and Ideology 
  
 
The factor of goals highlights a few issues that should be considered when 
attempting to negotiate a political settlement with a violent non-state actor. When 
considering a violent non-state actor’s goals, the analysis determined that groups 
concerned with policy change and territorial change have the highest likelihood of 
politicizing (Figure 8). With respect to an organization’s goals, if its desired end-state is 
to establish an empire, historically there is less than a one percent chance that 
politicization will work. If the group desires policy, regime, or territorial change, 




Figure 8.  Politicization and Goals 
 
 
With respect to the lifespan of an organization, the longer one exists, the more 
likely it is to politicize; however, there is a wide confidence band as groups achieve 
longevity. Although it shows a trend, lifespan is not shown as a significant predicting 










Figure 9.  Politicization and Lifespan 
  
 
In the case of regime type, the majority of terrorist organizations that politicize 
did so in a free democratic regime. This is understandable given the democratic process 
of election by majority vote. Hence, if an organization has enough support from the 
community, they are more likely to be elected and address their grievances from within 
the existing political framework. This factor was, however, shown to have a wide range-
band in politicization. 
Lastly, with respect to economic conditions, the percentages demonstrate that the 
economy of the state in which the terrorists operate does not have bearing on a 
predisposition to politicize. 
Table 2 reports the results from modifying the politics model into 8 separate 
models. Each model utilized a single or grouping of independent factors. The first 6 
models utilized a single independent factor, where models 7 through 9 utilized groups of 
like independent factors. For example, each type of goal (“regime change, territorial 
change, policy change, regime change, and social revolution”) was grouped together.66 
                                                 
66 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 52. 
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Interestingly, size (only at the 100 range) is shown to be significant along with 
negotiations, regime type, ideology, and goals (Table 2). This provides evidence that 
further supports the significance of ideology and goal type. They produced AIC scores of 
551 and 568 respectively. 




Table 3 reports the results from the original model in regard to ending type. The 
different endings were the dependent variables: politics, policing, splintering, victory and 
military force. Each model contains the same independent factors: peak size (Peak.Size), 
lifespan (Lifespan..0.recoded.to.1), negotiation (Negotiate), attacks on government or 
military (govmil), economy (Economy), freedom scale (FreeScale), right-wing 
(Right.Wing), nationalist (Nationalist), religious ideologies (Religion), regime change 
(Regime.Change), territorial change (Territorial.Change), policy change (Policy.Change), 
empire (Empire), and social revolution (Social.Revolution). The results of this analysis 
demonstrate more predictability in the model with respect to victory and military force. 
This is based on their AIC scores of 118 for victory and 149 for military force. 
The model, intended to predict and determine conditions for politicization, 
actually had a lower AIC for victory and military force and predicts the outcomes of 
those ending types better than it does for politicization. Looking at all ending types, 
though, one can confirm across almost all types that goals and ideology are the most 
important factors (Table 3). Additionally, negotiations and size seem to have significance 
across different ending types (Table 3). 
Conducting a ROC curve analysis for all ending types, the previous results were 
confirmed. Models 4 and 5 had the most predictive accuracy (Figure 10). This indicates 
that the factors this analysis studies for politicization are also significant, in fact even 






















Given the factors considered, the likelihood that current or future terrorist groups 
will end through politicization can be assessed. Policy makers may use this information 
to determine the type and level of support necessary to combat emerging terrorist threats 
around the world. If the probability of finding a political solution is high, then the United 
States. could support and advise the host country appropriately. Likewise, if the 
probability is low or non-existent, the United States could look at other solutions such as 
supporting policing or military efforts through Security Force Assistance (SFA) and 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Ultimately, by examining the conditions and motivations 
of those organizations that did politicize in the past, a probability of finding a similar 
peaceful solution for future violent organizations may be found. 
Like all models, this one is not perfect, but it can support basic analysis for 
evaluating end game solutions of violent non-state actors. Based upon mathematical and 
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historical data, the probability for success of politicization, policing, military, splintering, 
or terrorist victory can be speculated. The results of the regression analysis suggest that 
additional factors may prove salient in determining the outcome, and future research 
should be focused on finding more statistically relevant factors. For example, the 
involvement of foreign governments on a group’s politicization was not taken into 
account; a surrogate war, financed or supported by an outside actor, changes the 
dynamics of a terrorist organization and can unduly influence it. 
The analysis continues with case studies chosen to represent successful, 
transitioning, or failed attempts at politicization. The following case studies validated the 
statistical findings above and provided insight into further factors that should be 
considered. 
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III. HIZBOLLAH: CURRENTLY TRANSITIONING 
Founded in 1982, following the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, 
Hizbollah’s name means Party of God.67 The original goal of Hizbollah “was to fight the 
Israeli occupation and create a Shi’a state in Lebanon, modeled on Iran.”68 As such, the 
organization was originally supported by Iran and remains so today. The origins of the 
organization and the external influences on it will be discussed more in depth later. 
Although not deemed “politicized” by most databases and still labeled a foreign terrorist 
organization by many countries, Hizbollah did enter the political arena in 1992. 
Hizbollah-backed politicians won eight of 128 parliamentary seats that year in the 
Lebanese election and ever since have maintained roughly 10 percent representation in 
parliament.69 In the year prior they had refused to participate in favor of continuing to 
criticize governmental mistakes and claimed that the system was corrupt.70 Hizbollah had 
not been willing to shoulder responsibility or recognize the government as legitimate. 
That position has slowly changed, however. Over the last two decades, Hizbollah 
has evolved from a violent non-state actor that “rejects participation in politics to a 
legitimate political party” with considerable influence, popular support, and autonomy 
within Lebanon.71 The organization’s transition from a violent extremist actor to a 
powerful political party was examined in order to analyze the internal and external 
factors that contributed to its evolution. Or conversely, perhaps determine factors that 
retarded that transition. Additionally, the reduction in violence that coincides with 
Hizbollah candidates running for political office demonstrates the importance of 
influencing other organizations to politicize and encourage further political action. Lastly, 
the transition from violence to political legitimacy corresponds with an increase in 
                                                 
67 Norton, Hezbollah, 34. 
68 Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malecˇkova ́, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal 
Connection,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 129, 
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69 Phillips, From Bullets to Ballots, 45. 
70 Norton, Hezbollah, 100. 
71 Ibid., xi. 
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Hizbollah’s autonomy from Iranian influence and a reduction in the organization’s 
transnational proliferation network ties. This demonstrates both the nationally stabilizing 
effects of politicization and the international benefits. 
A. BACKGROUND 
In many ways, Hizbollah’s inception and support is derived from Israeli policies. 
When Israel invaded southern Lebanon in 1982 and stayed, Hizbollah was formed. 
Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak explained in 2006 “when we entered 
Lebanon… there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers 
by the Shi’a in the south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah.”72 Iran saw an 
opportunity to advance its own interests in the region when Israel invaded and actively 
assisted with the organization and construction of Hizbollah. The organization first 
gained notoriety and international attention in 1983 by bombing the U.S. Marine barracks 
in Beirut.73 In 1988–89 fighting erupted between Amal, who was at the time the premier 
Shi’a militant organization in Lebanon, and the then fledgling Hizbollah over the 
kidnapping of U.S. Marine LTC Higgins.74 An Amal affiliated group sympathetic to the 
more militant Hizbollah kidnapped Higgins threatening Amal’s cooperative relationship 
with United Nations International Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL). Although Amal remains 
popular in southern Lebanon, Hizbollah eroded their power and military influence in 
Beirut during this conflict.75 Similarly, Iranian material and religious backing has 
allowed Hizbollah to supplant Amal over the years.76 
The 2006 war, when Israel retaliated to Hizbollah’s capture of two Israeli soldiers 
by invading southern Lebanon, catapulted the national and international perception of the 
Hizbollah as a military force to be reckoned with. While the war ended in a stalemate, it 
also solidified Hizbollah’s role as a powerful political player and military player in the 
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state, as the “regional exemplar for opposition minded Muslims.”77 Importantly, in the 
war with Israel, although there was no clear declared victor, Hizbollah’s perceived 
strength and resiliency gained it significant popular support. The organization won the 
information war, in part, through sustained fighting and rocket attacks. In fact, Hizbollah 
fired more rockets on the last day of the conflict than it did on the first.78 This indicated 
to the world the organization’s might and evolution into a viable and formidable fighting 
force. It also allowed Hizbollah to publically claim victory. 
B. CONDITIONS 
The conditions that lead to politicization have statistically been analyzed in a 
number of studies. This chapter will specifically analyze: negotiations occurring, the 
ideology of the organization, motivations, target selection, and the longevity of Hizbollah 
to determine if its conditions are consistent with previously calculated probabilities. This 
may provide valuable insight into the direction Hizbollah is heading as an organization. 
The data associated with negotiations indicates that entering into talks greatly 
increases the probability of politicizing. Hizbollah has negotiated extensively with the 
Lebanese government over disarming and its position within the political apparatus.79 
Statistical examination indicates that after five or six years of a violent actors existence, 
entering into talks will often facilitate their decline or transition to politics.80 “There is a 
direct correlation between the age of groups and the probability of talks, but…only about 
one in five groups of any age have entered into talks on strategic issues.”81 Although 
roughly half of terrorist groups that enter into talks do not cease violence during 
negotiations, the levels of violence do tend to decline once negotiations begin.82 Only one 
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in ten of these talks fail once they have started.83 So, once Lebanon brought Hizbollah to 
the negotiation table, there was already a high likelihood of being able to encourage a 
move toward political action. 
In 2008, after nearly 18 months of sit-in protests, Hizbollah received concession 
from the majority government alliance. An outside actor, Qatar, mediated the 
negotiations. In return for “promising not to use armed force within Lebanon to solve 
internal political problems,” Hizbollah gained veto power in the cabinet.84 Importantly, 
they did not agree to disarm, which was the crux of the negotiation. More recently, the 
debate of disarmament has evolved. The national defense strategic debate in Lebanon is 
considering maintaining Hizbollah’s militant wing as an asymmetric counter to external 
threats.85 The debate centers on incorporating Hizbollah’s militant wing into the national 
defense plan, instead of disarming them. This would align the group with the Lebanese 
military while maintaining a degree of its autonomy. While maintaining a violent non-
state actor’s militant force sounds alarming, stipulating oversight from the Lebanese 
military would decrease potential international threats from the organization. 
Hizbollah is an ideologically religious organization. Its leaders and followers are 
motivated by Shi’a solidarity. In order to win elections or gain majority voting, though, 
their party often aligns with other minority groups, which demonstrates a degree of 
pragmatism and tolerance not typical to religiously motivated violent non-state actors. 
Statistically, religiously motivated groups are extremely unlikely to politicize, evidenced 
by only one ever moving toward political action according to RAND’s definition and 
database. This trend may be on the verge of changing, however, as religiously motivated 
groups continue to become more widespread.86 As the “wave” of religiously motivated 
organizations continues violent non-state actors are likely to continue to become more 
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resilient and last longer. Hizbollah’s demonstrated practicality indicates that their 
ideology may not be as limiting to their politicization as past trends have shown. 
Hizbollah is a regime-change motivated group; meaning in its original charter the 
organization wanted to replace the Lebanese government by “freeing the people from 
internal and external domination.”87 The open letter that Hizbollah released in 1985 
justified its use of violence to free the Lebanese people but did not address its own 
political design for Lebanon. Statistically speaking, groups with regime-change 
grievances are one of the most likely to negotiate and eventually politicize.88 So, while 
Hizbollah’s ideological underpinnings implicate a resistance to political action, their 
overall goals show the opposite. Additionally, although Hizbollah has never renounced 
the harsh language or declarations in their open letter, their goals have continued to 
evolve as they have begun to participate in the Lebanese political process. 
Hizbollah’s target selection is consistent with a group that politicizes. In all the 
successful cases of violent non-state actor politicization the group has attacked “military” 
and “diplomatic” targets more than “civilian” ones.89 Hizbollah maintains this trend with 
a total of 176 government and military attack incidents (Figure 11) and 108 civilian 
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Figure 11.  Hizbollah Government-related Targets 
 





Additionally, it is worth noting that Hizbollah’s attacks on civilian targets 
dropped below eight per year in 1987 and has remained that way through the present.91 
Not only is their aggregate “target type” ratio congruent with groups that politicize, their 





                                                 






Figure 12.  Hizbollah Civilian-related Targets 
 






Hizbollah has existed for over three decades, statistically the longer a group exists 
the more likely it is to politicize. Therefore, the longevity of Hizbollah indicates a 
positive relationship with the probability of further and continued politicization. 
Furthermore, Hizbollah is hierarchical in its organization.92 This creates conditions 
favorable to politicization because Hizbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, provides 
centralized guidance and direction that followers are expected to adhere to.93 Dissent is 
not tolerated in hierarchical organizations therefore politicization is more probable. As 
opposed to cellular structured groups lacking strong centralized leadership.94 So, because 
it is a hierarchical organization that has demonstrated resiliency and longevity further 
politicization of Hizbollah seems probable.95 
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C. VIOLENCE LEVELS 
By analyzing violence levels before and after politicization, with politicization 
defined as the first time Hizbollah ran for a political office, the effects of transitioning to 
politics can be determined. Specifically within Lebanon, Hizbollah has conducted a total 
of 302 incidents (Figure 13).96 Taking into account its entry into politics in 1992, though, 
one can quickly see that the number of incidents drops significantly following political 
action. There is a sharp rise in incidents in 2006 due to the war with Israel. 
Figure 13.  Hizbollah Lebanon Violence Level 
 





                                                 





When adjusted to account for both national and international incidents, Hizbollah 
has conducted 384 total incidents over the organization’s lifespan (Figure 14).97 The 
more recent increase illustrated below is largely due to Hizbollah’s current operations in 
Syria against Sunni extremist. 
Figure 14.  Hizbollah Total Violence Level 
 





Although Hizbollah continues to have a militant wing despite becoming a 
political party in Lebanon, from the figures it is clear that there has been a decrease in 
violence following the 1992 elections. In the first decade of its existence, Hizbollah 
conducted a total of 177 attacks (17.7 per year).98 In the twenty-two years since it entered 
                                                 









Lebanese politics, the total number of attacks is 207 (9.4 per year).99 This shows a 47 
percent decline in Hizbollah’s attack rate since politicization. 
D. PROLIFERATION 
Iranian nuclear weapon aspirations continue to remain evident and the likelihood 
of that goal being achieved is becoming more probable, so it is increasingly important to 
prevent proliferation to violent non-state actors associated with Iran. The nuclear deal’s 
limitations and the Iranian position with respect to the deal were clearly explained by 
Iran’s deputy foreign minister following the P5+1 agreement. He stated that the deal 
“didn’t include limitations on Iran’s weapons capabilities or missile power and that 
Tehran would keep arming its regional allies.”100 Abbas Araqchi went on to explain on 
Iranian state television, “we have told [the P5+1 world powers] in the negotiations that 
we will supply arms to anyone and anywhere necessary and will import weapons from 
anywhere we want and we have clarified this during the negotiations.”101 So, while 
Iranian nuclear aspirations have been stymied by the agreement and it is doubtful that 
Iran would ever use nuclear weapons beyond a strategy of deterrence and influence 
within their region, it is not improbable for proliferation to occur to a violent non-state 
actor for an attack to be conducted by a proxy force. This is where further politicization 
of Hizbollah becomes extremely important. As Hizbollah enters further into the political 
arena in Lebanon, and becomes a more powerful political party within the governmental 
system, their level of violence and influence from outside actors has decreased. While 
Iran does still have influence, they no longer have “veto” power, and they increasingly do 
not have operational or planning input in Hizbollah’s militant acts or political 
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decisions.102 This is significant when one considers the possibilities of proliferation in a 
potentially nuclear-armed Iranian world. As Hizbollah becomes more politically powerful 
on a national scale they also become more independent from Iranian influence, reduce 
their levels of violence, and are therefore less likely to participate in transnational 
proliferation due to its potential degradation of their political legitimacy. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Hizbollah is perhaps a somewhat unique “terrorist organization” in that its 
primary goal and focus was always to fight an outside state entity, Israel. In this respect 
the organization garnered significant popular support from the Lebanese people when the 
Lebanese government and military were unable to adequately provide material support 
and protection from Israeli incursions into Lebanon. It has evolved into a powerful 
political party, though, and encouraging further politicization will lead to more oversight 
from the Lebanese government, which will, in turn, lead to less violence and external 
influence on the organization. Further national politicization of Hizbollah will, over time, 
alienate the group from its state sponsor of Iran and continue its reduction of national and 
international violence. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, as Hizbollah 
continues to become more intimately entwined with governmental politics within 
Lebanon, the likelihood of it proliferating via the transnational violent non-state actor 
network becomes less and less probable. Instead of alienating Hizbollah, the international 
community would be well advised to instead attempt to influence their further 
politicization. The conditions expounded upon in the preceding section indicate that 
further politicization is probable. Advancing that transition will decrease the potential 
threat of Hizbollah to the international community. 
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IV. IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY: TRANSITION SUCCESS 
The increasing number and frequency of radical movements throughout the world 
over the past century has brought to light the inadequacies and pitfalls of many states’ 
abilities to suppress or control these movements. Due to this growing concern it may 
prove useful to more adequately examine how and why a specific former violent 
extremist group decided to moderate. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was once one of 
the most violent and effective terrorist organizations in the world. As a point of clarity, in 
order to remain succinct, this chapter will not delineate between or devote time to 
describing the different splinter groups of the republican movement, but will instead refer 
to all militant republican factions broadly as the IRA. Today, the IRA has demilitarized 
and been completely subsumed by the republican movement’s political wing, Sinn Fein. 
So, why did the IRA decide to give up their arms and work toward their aims politically 
rather than violently and what conditions encouraged them to do so? The answer to this 
question has implications far beyond Ireland and Great Britain. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein, as most people think of it today, 
began after the Irish Volunteer’s staged the Easter Rebellion in 1916. While the Feinians 
trace their roots much further back to the Irish Republican Brotherhood founded in 1858, 
it wasn’t until after 1916 that the IRA organization began to emerge.103 The Easter 
Rebellion brought the issue of Home Rule, or self-determination, to the forefront of the 
Irish politics. This was mostly due to Great Britain’s handling of the Irish rebels after 
they retook Dublin. Interestingly, the initial reaction of most Dubliners was decidedly 
against the rebellion. Due to the hardships it had caused the majority of citizens, when the 
rebellion leaders were initially captured and marched through the city they were jeered 
and had vegetables thrown at them.104 The subsequent execution of sixteen of the 
rebellion’s leaders, however, created a public relations fiasco across Ireland for Great 
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Britain.105 It effectively martyred the leaders of the rebellion, increasing grassroots 
support for their cause. To this day, there is still a memorial in the former Arbour Hill 
prison where fourteen of the men were executed by firing squad. The Easter Rebellion 
soldiers that were not killed spent time in a Wales prison, where they perfected their trade 
and adjusted their strategic methods. Michael Collins, a foot soldier captured during the 
Easter Rebellion, emerged as a new leader of the republican movement with a different 
strategy for winning Irish independence.106 Sinn Fein, with the new political clout 
garnered from the rebellion, began to work in concert with the IRA insurgency strategy 
toward achieving an independent and self-determined Ireland. 
This connection was initially precarious and throughout the years there were 
numerous violent rifts in the IRA over the amount of force necessary and its relationship 
to republican politics. There were divergent views and conflict about gaining 
independence and uniting Ireland via military force or via political means. Throughout 
most of the 20th century the militant wing dominated that discussion. After the 1922 
partitioning of Ireland, the IRA garnered popular support in Northern Ireland by 
protecting Catholic neighborhoods from loyalist paramilitary sectarian groups. But in the 
early 1980s, when IRA activists in the H-block of the prison, started a hunger strike over 
their living conditions and treatment as common criminals instead of political prisoners, a 
number of IRA leaders realized the potential of emphasizing politics more than violence. 
The hunger strikers drew national and international attention to Sinn Fein and the IRA’s 
cause. Bobby Sands, the leader of the strike, died in prison along with ten other hunger 
strike prisoners.107 Significantly, during the strike Sands was elected as a Member of 
Parliament and many of his fellow prisoners were also elected to lesser political positions 
throughout Northern Ireland. The grass roots support and outrage the hunger strike 
generated drove the republican movement toward political mobilization in a way not seen 
since “the troubles” in 1969.108 During that previous period, the IRA had split over the 
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policy of abstentionism, whereby republicans would run for political office but if elected 
would refuse to sit or participate in any assembly because that would acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the British system. While Sinn Fein had always been closely connected 
with the IRA, it had never been the more powerful organization. After “the troubles” 
when sectarian violence between the republicans and loyalist killed over 2,000 people in 
Northern Ireland, and beginning with the H-block hunger strikes, that began to change.109 
Danny Morrison, a Sinn Fein spokesman and IRA member, explained in 1981 the 
shifting mindset by stating, “Who here really believes we can win a war through the 
ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and an 
Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?”110 Initially, this shift was due to a 
realization that Sinn Fein had more widespread popular support because of Britain’s 
reaction to the hunger strike. The same shift had happened after 1916. To a lesser degree, 
it also happened in Northern Ireland whenever British forces, or loyalist paramilitary 
units, used brutality for enforcement and accidentally, or intentionally in some cases, 
killed Catholic citizens. The British perpetuated a classic counterinsurgency mishap by 
pushing the populace into the arms of the militants through alienating and minimizing 
their grievances, thereby making them voiceless and disenfranchised with the acting 
government. Britain’s tacit allowance of sectarian violence only served to bolster the 
IRA, in the same way the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon necessitated armed 
protection forces in the eyes of many Shia locals.111 The IRA had always been skilled at 
taking advantage of Great Britain’s mistakes, but the shift toward politicization and 
renewed power of Sinn Fein was triggered by more than just a recognized opportunity. 
By the 1980s, the IRA was losing material and personnel support at an alarming rate. 
Twenty-six militant members died violently between 1987 and 1988.112 Even more 
significantly, the victims of the IRA’s politically motivated violence were not always 
military opposition forces, and the IRA recognized that it was risking political 
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catastrophe if the pattern continued.113 The leadership of the republican movement 
endeavored to alter the strategy, using the IRA’s violence as a tightly controlled tactic in 
order to gain strategic political advances.114 In 1986, the majority of Sinn Fein decided to 
end abstentionism and begin to participate in the political apparatus that they did not 
recognize as legitimate.115 It was an important step toward a peaceful resolution 
influenced by the ascension of a younger generation of IRA leaders. 
The process of legitimate political talks began with the rise and empowerment of 
the Sinn Fein party. This was an important step in finding a middle ground for further 
negotiations with the IRA. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, it was a step 
toward further politicization of the IRA and legitimization of the hardline republican 
political entity. Significantly, portions of Great Britain political elite seem to have finally 
begun to realize the pathway to peace was through politics and not through military 
means. The IRA strategy, however, publically remained the same as stated in 1989 that, 
“at some point in the future, due to the pressure of the continuing and sustained armed 
struggle, the will of the British government to remain in this country will be broken. That 
is the objective of the armed struggle…we can state confidently today that there will be 
no ceasefire and no truces until Britain declares its intent to withdraw and leave our 
people in peace.”116 Privately within the organization the tides were changing as Gerry 
Adams and Martin McGuiness, legitimate and credible militant leaders began to urge 
further politicization. 
While the British certainly made numerous mistakes during the IRA’s move from 
violence to politics, it is important to point out the ways they did encourage politicization. 
In 1994, multi-party negotiations began after the IRA agreed to a ceasefire.117 Tony Blair 
allowed talks to begin despite British initial insistence for the IRA to decommission all 
arms prior to talks. These talks eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 and 
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the decommissioning of IRA arms beginning in 2001.118 The Good Friday settlement set 
up an “inclusive devolved government in the North, and altered the Southern 
government’s constitutional claim to the whole island” in the Constitution of Ireland.119 
Through negotiations both sides were able to achieve victories they had been fighting for 
decades. Because of the Good Friday Agreement, “after 27 years of direct rule from 
London, authority over local affairs was transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly 
and Executive on December 1, 1999. London, however, retained control over ‘reserved’ 
matters including policing, prisons, and the criminal justice system.”120 Difficulties 
remained however, and the devolution did not take effect until a power sharing agreement 
was made between the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party, a loyalist political party, and 
Sinn Fein later in 2007.121 But the significance of the compromise and resulting sustained 
impact of Sinn Fein’s power over the militant movement was vital. Sinn Fein formally 
and publically called on the IRA to completely demilitarize on April 6, 2005, when Gerry 
Adams asked the IRA “to abandon violence and [engage in] politics as an alternative to 
armed struggle.”122 Shortly after, on July 28, 2005, the IRA directed an end to its armed 
campaign instructing all members to “pursue aims through exclusively peaceful means” 
and to “not engage in any other activities whatsoever.”123 IRA units were instructed to 
“dump arms.”124 By encouraging politicization through sincere and equitable 
negotiations Great Britain was able discourage legitimacy through violence and instead 
support legitimacy through politics. 
B. CONDITIONS 
Due to the fact that the IRA is a group that has politicized, an analysis of the 
conditions this transition occurred under is essential. Considering the same previous 
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factors may demonstrate similarities that encouraged a move toward politics over 
violence. The conditions that allowed that movement are significant in determining how 
violent-centric organizations can be urged toward non-violent means. 
Initially, the British repeatedly promoted IRA violence through their own 
brutality and marginalization of the Catholic communities, first in Ireland and later in 
Northern Ireland. By not adequately enforcing the rule of law and allowing 
indiscriminate sectarian violence between loyalist and republicans, the Catholic 
communities were pushed into the open arms of the IRA for protection. Without the 
popular support gained from that protection the IRA likely would have been hard pressed 
to remain as relevant as it did for so long. The prolonged existence and adapting nature of 
the IRA and Sinn Fein have made it impracticable to examine every aspect of the conflict 
and the associated conditions. Thus, this analysis focuses mainly on the conditions and 
timeframe leading up to politicization. 
From the IRA and Sinn Fein’s position, numerous factors stimulated their 
participation in negotiations. As their own popular support ebbed and flowed, they 
became more or less interested in politics, and as such negotiating a political settlement. 
At different times throughout the history of the conflict the republicans believed they 
held a majority backing in Ireland. When this was the case they moved toward political 
means. Likewise, when the militant republicans were hard pressed by material and/or 
personnel losses they moved toward politics as a means of negotiating their end-state. 
They did not want to risk destruction by directly confronting governmental forces and 
needed to attempt to maintain effective protection and control of the populace.125 Today, 
Sinn Fein is the second largest party in the Northern Ireland Assembly, and a legitimate 
peaceful political party.126 It is the fourth largest party in the Republic of Ireland. 
Meanwhile the IRA, minus small separatist paramilitary splinter units, has completely 
demilitarized. While there are numerous examples of negotiations occurring, most failed. 
They did often prompt lulls in violence, though. 
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What finally brought about successful negotiations was a change in the mindset 
on both sides of the aisle. The British finally recognized that the grass roots popularity 
the IRA and Sinn Fein had was largely due to their treatment of their Catholic Northern 
Irish constituents. During negotiations, the British decided to first grant Home Rule, then 
later removed British troops from Northern Ireland, and finally devolve the Northern 
Ireland government. These concessions were, during each instance, negotiated with the 
republican movement in return for compromises of reduced violence or cessation of 
hostilities. Successful negotiations were perhaps the single most influential aspect in 
fostering politicization. As interim goals on both sides of the conflict began to be realized 
due to political negotiations instead of violence Sinn Fein gained more authority and 
influence over the IRA’s militant wing.127 Additionally, the sway of a powerful third-
party, in the case of the Good Friday Agreement President Clinton and the United States, 
created an unbiased influential outside actor that further legitimized negotiations and 
ensured accountability on both sides.128 It was the Good Friday Agreement that finally 
ended the violence, demilitarized the IRA, and solidified Sinn Fein and politics as the 
way forward for republicans.129 
The IRA’s ideology was nationalist. Statistically only 29 percent of violent non-
state actors that ended via politicization were nationalist.130 The IRA example, similar to 
Hizbollah’s religious-ideology two percent likelihood, challenges this trend.131 Again 
this may indicate that despite the statistical indication that ideology is a significant factor 
in a group’s politicization, a more noteworthy gauge is the leadership’s pragmatism. In 
the case of the IRA, it seems that when the leadership of the organization realized the 
possibilities of success in the political arena due to rising popular support they shifted the 
organization’s techniques accordingly.132 When their political power began to 
overshadow the IRA’s military strength the republican movement’s focus shifted and 
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further politicization became more likely. Similar to Hizbollah, Sinn Fein negotiated and 
made political alliances with adversaries, such as the Social Democratic and Labour 
Party, demonstrating the republican movement’s practicality.133 
The hierarchical nature of Sinn Fein and the IRA created conditions favorable to 
politicization.134 In order for the movement to disarm and legitimize politically, though, 
it required leaders with respected militant reputations to acknowledge and push toward 
politicization. Throughout the IRA’s history when there was a clash between the military 
and political wings, splinter groups formed. In order to retain the majority of the militant 
republican movement in a move to politicization, and therefore have legitimacy at the 
bargaining table that they would be able to enforce disarmament and cease fires, political 
leaders needed influence within the militant arm. With the rise of Gerry Adams and 
Martin McGuiness the IRA and Sinn Fein had forward thinking, persuasive, and 
militarily-authoritative leaders that wanted politicization. This permitted an element of 
political authority over the military wing previously missing. 
The IRA was motivated by unification, which for the purposes of this statistical 
analysis is categorized as territorial change. This type of goal statistically has one of the 
highest likelihoods of politicizing. Although the IRA’s territorial goals were not realized, 
many of their grievances associated with that change were eventually addressed. British 
troops were removed, IRA members were granted political status in prisons, the Northern 
Ireland government was devolved, and numerous additional considerations were 
conceded. Once those grievances were addressed the justification for violence, and 
popular support for the group to conduct violence on behalf of those grievances, was 
removed. This created conditions in which politicization was probable. Although 
territorially motivated violent extremist groups will rarely achieve the full breadth of their 
goal, by addressing the concerns associated with that goal politicization becomes likely. 
The IRA’s target selection was also consistent with a group that politicizes. The 
IRA attacked a total of 1,487 military and government targets (Figure 15) and 1,091 
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civilian ones (Figure 16) over the 44 years of this database.135 This translates to roughly 
58 percent of the IRA’s targets being focused on strictly military or government entities, 
which, if used predictively, would have been a clear indication that politicization was 
probable.136 Additionally, almost all targeting ceased after the 1998 Good Friday 
agreement. It is this analysis’ assertion that if the different splinter groups of the IRA 
were removed from the targeting statistics, or if the database covered the entirety of the 
IRA’s existence, the disparity between government-related and civilian-related targets 
would be even more glaring. At various times in the history of the conflict, more hardline 
elements of the IRA splintered because of disagreements related to concessions to Great 
Britain or further politicization. This dataset does not differentiate between the different 
groups. Splinter organizations, such as the Real IRA or Continuity IRA, tended to be 
more radical and therefore also less discerning in their target selection. Even the PIRA, 
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Figure 15.  IRA Government-related Targets 
 





Figure 16.  IRA Civilian-related Targets 
 







Lastly, the durability of IRA also indicates the prospect of politicizing. The IRA 
remained in armed conflict with Great Britain for almost a century. Sinn Fein, or at least 
the precursor to it, has existed for nearly two centuries. The longevity of these 
organizations and their consistent, although sometimes tumultuous, relationship with 
each other is evidence of the republican movement’s propensity to move toward politics. 
The combination of a hierarchical organization, where dissent and splintering is less 
likely, and the longevity of the republican movement are both indicative plausible 
politicization. It seems intuitive that if a group has enough popular support to remain 
militarily relevant for decades it could similarly be a powerful political entity. 
C. VIOLENCE LEVELS 
By analyzing violence levels before and after politicization the effects of the 
IRA’s transition to politics can be discerned. In the case of the IRA, politicization is 
defined as ending the abstentionism policy within the republican movement in Northern 
Ireland. The IRA and Sinn Fein maintained a policy of abstentionism for decades, 
whereby members would run for office but then refuse to sit, thereby refusing to 
acknowledge the authority of the government. There was even a ban on discussing the 
policy of abstentionism. It was not until after the IRA hunger strikers, in 1981, gained the 
republican movement considerable political clout, that the ban on that discussion was 
lifted.138 At the time Gerry Adams maintained that Sinn Fein was still “an abstentionist 
party. It is not my intention to advocate change in this situation.”139 
In 1986, the policy was finally lifted, although it resulted in a split within the 
republican movement, politically creating the Republican Sinn Fein and later the 
militaristic Continuity IRA. The spike in attacks indicated in Figures 15 and 16 in the late 
1980s can be attributed to ending abstentionism and the resulting dispute within the 
republican movement. The hardline elements within Sinn Fein and the IRA tried to 
reassert their control and in the end lost support due to their inability to compromise. 
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The 1998 Good Friday agreement, in simplistic terms, devolved the Northern 
Ireland government, delegated administration of the country from the United Kingdom, 
and created institutional links between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in 
return for decommissioning IRA weapons.140 Analyzing the aggregate attack trend in 
Figure 17, there is a clear and evident reduction in violence following this agreement. 
Once Sinn Fein members began to actively participate in the Northern Ireland 
government, and the radical elements within the republican movement were 
marginalized, violence levels plummeted. This is not surprising considering that Sinn 
Fein impressed upon the IRA the terms of the Good Friday agreement which included 
laying down arms. The political influence needed to end the policy of abstentionism 
within Sinn Fein and the military authority required to enforce an end in violent 
opposition within the IRA, however, are inescapably linked. It took over a decade of 
actually participating in Northern Ireland’s political process to advance to the point where 
political members of the republican movement had more sway than military leaders. 
Figure 17.  IRA Violence Level 
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&search=irish%20repu
blican%20army. 
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This alludes to an interesting point; in some cases politicization is just the 
beginning of ending violence. Due to the degree of radicalization of members within any 
violent extremist organization, splintering is likely to occur in the politicization process. 
This will almost always translate into violence continuing for a time once politicization 
has begun. Nearly every spike in violence in Figure 17 can be attributed to a splintering 
in the republican movement. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The IRA example is a case of successful politicization. Given similar 
circumstances other violent extremist organizations could be encouraged to do the same. 
In the case of the IRA and Sinn Fein, the significant factors were a belief that they 
represented a large enough portion of the population to be influential if they were given a 
political voice. Having hierarchical leadership that brought enough military clout to keep 
the majority of the organization appeased and on board with the direction the movement 
was going. Lastly, there was a realization that military victory was not possible and a 
stalemate had occurred.141 Equally, Great Britain was willing to negotiate and concede to 
some of the conditions the republicans demanded while calling for their own stipulations 
regarding IRA demilitarization. Great Britain was able to establish a dialogue with the 
opposition to hear their grievances and was consistently adept enough to bring them back 
to the table when negotiations broke down. Given these conditions the situation was ripe 
for politicization and resolution via non-violent means. Despite what many would call 
unlimited war aims on either side, or the nationalistic nature of the IRA’s ideology, 
politicization was able to occur. 
Notably, the implications for politicization extend beyond national borders. The 
IRA laid down their arms and became a legitimate, moderated representative for their 
constituents through Sinn Fein. In doing so, national politicization decreased the 
international proliferation network of violent extremist organizations that is stimulated 
when they are not urged to legitimize politically. In addition to reducing violence in 
Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and the Republic of Ireland, by influencing hardline 
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republicans in the IRA to politicize and gain national representation, the international 
proliferation network was limited. The IRA had previously maintained connections with 
the Palestine Liberation Organization, Gaddafi, and the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia, among other groups.142 A link in that network was 
destroyed when they politicized. As the IRA’s national movement was legitimized 
politically it was no longer incentivized to internationalize for support or to use violence 
to gain legitimacy. 
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V. PARTIYA KARKERÊN KURDISTANÊ: TRANSITION IN 
QUESTION 
If the young republic of Turkey had opted for a democratic solution to the 
Kurdish question, then the course of history would surely have been 
different.143 
—Abdullah Ocalan, 2012 
 
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK), is a 
Kurdish nationalist organization with socialist roots located in the surrounding border 
area of southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq.144 As with Hizbollah, the PKK is not 
considered a “politicized” entity and is still considered a terrorist organization. The 
organization is currently undergoing a tumultuous negotiation process with the Turkish 
government. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party is 
considered to be in a transitioning status. The PKK’s internal and external factors were 
examined in order to determine whether they are conducive to a successful transition to 
politics in the near future. Examining the characteristics of a successful transition 
identified earlier in this analysis, it becomes clear that many of the strides the PKK is 
making are conducive to a transition to politics. The stance of their ultimate goal, an 
autonomous Kurdistan, appears to have softened to a more plausible objective of greater 
representation and self-governance. A successful transition would further demonstrate the 
effects of national stabilization garnered from a violent non-state actor’s politicization. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party was originally formed in 1974 with the aim of 
creating an independent Kurdish state.145 Although initially just comprised of a group of 
ethnically-Kurdish students in Turkey, the organization formalized in 1978 and sought to 
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incite a revolution that would free the Kurdish people and create a new state.146 The 
struggle for Kurdish independence, though, actually first emerged in the late 19th 
century. Later, in 1920, the Treaty of Sevres did designate an independent Kurdistan, but 
the plan was never implemented.147 The PKK traces its roots back to these struggles. In 
its endeavor to establish a new state, the PKK was supported by more than thirty other 
Kurdish groups in neighboring states including: the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in 
Syria, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 
Iraq, the Party of Free Life (PJAK) in Iran, and a few in Europe. Now the predominant 
focus of the PKK appears to be seeking autonomy within the established state borders of 
Turkey in lieu of establishing a Kurdish state partitioned from Turkey, Iraq, Iran, 
Armenia, and Syria.148 
In order to build strength early on, the PKK fled Turkey and established training 
camps in Syrian-controlled Lebanon.149 This training was supported by Palestinian 
contacts of the PKK founder, Abdullah Ocalan.150 Later, during the early 1980s, 
conditions were favorable for the PKK to relocate their training camps to northern Iraq 
through support of the KDP where the PKK prepared to mount a campaign against 
Turkey.151 By 1984, the PKK had returned to Turkey and began its first armed attacks 
against both government and non-sympathetic civilian targets in the Anatolia regions.152 
Their targets included “government installations and officials, Turks living in the 
country’s Kurdish regions, Kurds accused of collaborating with the government, 
foreigners, and Turkish diplomatic missions abroad.”153 At its height, the PKK had a 
force of fifty thousand guerrillas, but it is now estimated to have less than five 
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thousand.154 During this timeframe, “some reports claim that the PKK killed over 30,000 
civilians within Turkey.”155 Later, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PKK ceased 
targeting Kurdish civilians and adjusted its ideology to accommodate Islamic beliefs. Its 
focus shifted to strictly targeting elements of the Turkish government.156 
B. CONDITIONS 
Several of the conditions that influence the PKK are consistent with the statistical 
data that indicates a violent non-state actor as a candidate for politicization. In particular, 
the data associated with parties entering into negotiations, and the PKK’s change in target 
selection. The PKK has actively sought out negotiations with Turkey and claims to desire 
politicization.157 The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), a legitimate pro-Kurdish 
political party within Turkey, has been negotiating on behalf of the PKK with Turkey for 
nearly two years.158 This greatly increases the probability of politicization for the PKK. 
The Turkish government appears reluctant to commit and encourage the PKK’s move 
toward politics, however. Similarly, the PKK has noticeably become more target 
discriminant over the years. 
The PKK’s target selection has drastically changed over the course of its history. 
Upon initial examination the PKK’s target comparison of government-related and 
civilian-related attacks look remarkably similar (Figures 18 and 19). The numbers 
indicate only a slightly larger number of attacks on government-related targets than 
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civilian-related targets: 742 compared to 725 respectively.159 Such an extremely small 
target discrimination difference would not imply much propensity to politicize.160 There 
is a notable drop in violence after 1996 with an overall downward trend in total violence, 
though, which will be discussed more in depth in the Violence Levels section. Specific to 
target selection, the PKK initially targeted Turkish civilians and Kurdish non-
sympathizers actively in their terror campaign.161 This trend has changed over time, 
however. When broken down by civilian target type, the graph reveals that of those 725 
civilian-related attacks, 428 were on infrastructure whereas only 297 were attacks on 
actual civilian personnel (Figure 20).162 This demonstrates that the PKK decreased its 
targeting of actual civilians during the late 1990s and has continued to target personnel 
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Figure 18.  PKK Government-related Targets 
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),” accessed 






Figure 19.  PKK Civilian-related Targets 
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),” accessed 








Figure 20.  PKK Civilian Personnel Targets 
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),” accessed 




While the PKK does have socialist, left-wing tendencies, which would indicate 
likelihood to politicize, ideologically the PKK is categorized as nationalist. This is due to 
the organization’s over-arching motivation of Kurdish self-governance within Turkey. 
Similar to this analysis’s other case studies, the PKK is challenging the statistical norm 
with regards to ideology and successful politicization. This demonstrates that the strong 
presence of other significant politicization factors can sometimes countermand adverse 
factors. Additionally, the PKK’s strong left-wing ideas may have more influence on their 
politicization then their nationalist ideology. 
The PKK is motivated by a desire for more autonomy, which for the purposes of 
this statistical analysis is categorized as territorial change. Statistically this implies a high 
likelihood of politicizing. Territorial change grievances account for 16 percent of violent 
non-state actors that politicized; only policy and regime change grievances have higher 
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probabilities.163 Similar to the IRA, the PKK’s territorial grievances are motivated by a 
perceived injustice toward the Kurdish people by the Turkish government. The 
organization’s desire for autonomy and violence against the government are direct results 
of that viewpoint. This also implies that if those grievances are adequately addressed, 
though, the PKK will not have the support of the people to commit violence nor the 
moral high ground to do so. The PKK leader, Ocalan, has already authored a ten-article 
framework of the PKK’s grievances that the organization believes need to be addressed 
for peace.164 
This framework has been the basis for negotiations between the Turkish 
government and the PKK. Ocalan has been the driving force behind negotiations, calling 
for the PKK to lay down arms and negotiate a peaceful resolution.165 Ocalan’s continued 
attempts to successfully complete negotiations, along with his meticulous outline of what 
concessions need to be made by both parties, demonstrate that a lack of negotiations will 
not be the PKK’s reason for an unsuccessful politicization. The organization’s continued 
attempts at negotiating a peaceful resolution with the Turkish government indicate a high 
probability of successfully politicization.166 
Additionally, the PKK’s violence levels while negotiations occur tend to decline 
(Figures 18 and 19).167 Ocalan’s third book while imprisoned entitled, Prison Writings 
III: The Road Map to Negotiations, “was the centerpiece of the secret dialogue process 
between Abdullah Ocalan and the Turkish state that started in 2009 and was broken off in 
mid-2011.”168 More recently, Ocalan has shown his commitment to the peace process by 
ordering the withdrawal of several thousand PKK fighters from Turkey, stating, “we have 
reached the point, where the weapons must fall silent and ideas need to speak. A door has 
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been opened that could lead from an armed conflict to a democratic one.”169 Despite the 
short breakdown in negotiations and the small spike in violence that followed, in 2012 
negotiations began again with the HDP negotiating on behalf of the PKK.170 Most of the 
PKK’s demands, such as “recognition of Kurdish identity and reinforcement of the 
authorities and autonomies of local administrations with constitutional guarantees in a 
new constitution,” are realistic and attainable.171 Due to the fact that some of Ocalan’s 
articles would require amending the Turkish constitution, however, the fate of the peace 
talks remains in the balance.172 The pro-Kurdish HDP’s recent parliamentary success 
bodes well for the PKK.173 On behalf of the PKK, HDP co-leader Selahattin Demirtas 
stated that they were, “ready to make a call for disarmament and that a peace process 
with the militants should soon move forward.”174 
The PKK has existed for over four decades. The longevity of the organization, 
despite its recent decline in membership, alludes to the grass-roots popularity of the 
Kurdish cause in Turkey. Due to the PKK’s demonstrated resiliency, it is unlikely the 
organization will end via continued military or police action. Their longevity indicates a 
higher probability of politicization and the organization’s leadership is certainly pushing 
for a political solution. 
Despite being incarcerated, Abdullah Ocalan’s influence and leadership within the 
PKK has not diminished. He was apprehended in 1999 and sentenced to death for 
treason.175 In its bid for admittance to the European Union, however, Turkey abolished its 
death penalty in 2002 and “Ocalan’s sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.”176 
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Since imprisonment, Ocalan has taken to writing about Kurdish history, the PKK, and his 
plans for politicization, making it clear his desired end-state for his organization. 
Ocalan’s effectiveness as a leader and his vision for the PKK has guided the 
group through sixteen years of operating while he is still incarcerated. The strict 
hierarchical structure of the PKK, along with Ocalan’s persistence in negotiations, hint at 
resolution to the conflict in the near future.177 Moreover, after realizing the futility of a 
violence-centric approach, as well as the difficulty in accomplishing the lofty goal of a 
Kurdish state, Ocalan has also distanced the PKK’s actions from the other four major 
Kurdish organizations in neighboring states. Ocalan has done this with an eye toward 
separating the PKK from violence in order to negotiate politically for Kurdish autonomy 
within Turkey in lieu of a Kurdish state. This is a critical period for peace negotiations 
between Turkey and the PKK. The current situation with the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) has complicated negotiations for a peaceful settlement, though. 
The internal and external factors surrounding the PKK are conducive to 
politicization. The group’s ideology, while not statistically indicative of politicizing, is 
consistent with each other case study examined. The PKK’s motivation falls in line with 
those groups who have had previous success moving to political action, and the group has 
been in existence for over four decades. The PKK’s transition away from attacking 
civilian personnel, and its decrease in overall attacks since first starting the negotiation 
process, are also indicative of a group ready to politicize. Lastly, the most significant in 
this case, the PKK has repeatedly negotiated with Turkey and its leader has begun to 
openly call for a political solution to the Kurdish issue. 
C. VIOLENCE LEVELS 
The guerrilla warfare campaign that the PKK started in Turkey was conducted by 
less than several hundred fighters in its early years, yet still caused the Turkish military 
much consternation as to how to deal with this new threat.178 “Military ‘search-and-
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destroy’ operations inside Turkey and air raids on supposed PKK base camps in Iran and 
Iraq failed to paralyse it. The government then recruited ‘loyal’ Kurds into the 
paramilitary guards, which, it was hoped, would be more effective in fighting the PKK 
guerrillas.”179 As noted earlier, the PKK was particularly violent toward civilian-related 
targets early in its existence, notably against these fellow Kurds. The high level of 
violence, including a high number of fatalities, against civilian-related targets was mostly 
against Kurdish people associated with the Turkish state who were not sympathetic to the 
PKK. These “landlords and petty officials…were assassinated, frequently with their 
entire families.”180 Turkey responded to this violence by sending military and police to 
quell the violence, but these same forces were ambushed themselves.181 “At first most 
Kurds recoiled in horror at the activities of the PKK, but since 1985 the counter-brutality 
of state forces, particularly the widespread use of arbitrary arrest and torture, has 
increased the cooperation or neutrality of large numbers of Kurds in eastern Turkey.”182 
This newfound cooperation with, or at least toleration by, the citizens, coupled with the 
cessation of targeting Kurdish civilians in the early 1990s, facilitated the major decrease 
in violence by the PKK beginning in 1996 (Figure 18). 
In another effort to commit to non-violence, the PKK altered its name to the 
Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) in 2002 and a year later devised 
a plan to establish Kurdish autonomy.183 The organization did, however, continue 
military training and threaten violence. In 2003, the organization announced that it was 
dissolving and reestablishing itself as the Kurdistan People’s Conference (KHK), which 
would focus on negotiations with Turkey.184 Later in 2003, the group again renamed to 
the Kongra-Gel (KGK, or Kurdistan People’s Congress) in an effort for negotiations to be 
taken seriously; but the group continued to commit violent attacks, failed to disarm, and 
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eventually reverted back to its original name in 2005.185 Despite the PKK’s efforts to 
transition to politics, Turkey has done little to assist in transitioning the organization. 
Without an incentive to maintain peace, when negotiations have broken down the PKK 
has resumed violence and the cease-fire did not last more than five years.186 
Violence continued after the cease-fire, but to a lesser degree than historically 
seen. In 2007, three years after the cease-fire ended, other parties took notice of the 
PKK’s decrease in violent attacks and increasing willingness to politicize. Falah Mustafa 
Bakir, head of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s foreign relations department at the 
time, stated “Our understanding is that the PKK may be prepared to join the political 
process in Turkey, and it is left to the Turkish government to seize this opportunity.”187 
Despite this realization by others, Turkish parliament continues to approve military action 
against the PKK at home and abroad.188 Although there was a spike in PKK attacks in 
2010 as a result of negotiations failing, the amount of violence remained below pre-
negotiation levels (Figure 21).189 
  
                                                 
185 Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party.” 
186 Bruno, “Inside the Kurdistan Workers Party.”  
187 Ibid. 
188 “Kurdistan Workers’ Party,” Encyclopedia Britannica. 
189 Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party.” 
 71 
Figure 21.  PKK’s History of Attacks 
  
Source: Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),” accessed 
October 21, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime 
&search=pkk. 
Now, in 2015, another declared ceasefire has held for almost two years and the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party is again at the negotiation table. According to Cernal Bayik, 
co-founder of the PKK, there is no longer a stated desire to establish a separate state or 
combine territories with other Kurdish entities in neighboring countries as seen with the 
“old PKK,” and that “all we want is to live freely with our own identity, culture, and 
values in democratic conditions.”190 In order to ensure this happens, though, Bayik has 
set one of the conditions for moving forward with peace talks as a U.S.- or European-led 
arbitration.191 This addition of a third-party arbitrator would add legitimacy and weight to 
the negotiations. 
Perhaps most notable with respect to PKK violence levels is the accusation that 
the HDP and its predecessors are the political wing of the organization. Since the Turkish 
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parliament has repeatedly banned pro-Kurdish political parties over the years, Kurdish 
political representation has had to reinvent itself under different names. The first pro-
Kurdish political party was the People’s Labor Party established in 1990.192 In 1993 the 
Turkish Constitutional Court disbanded the party. Party supporters then founded the 
Democracy Party, though, which was similarly closed in 1994 by the Constitutional 
Court and pro-Kurdish party members lost their parliamentary seats.193 The political 
party then reformed and reconstituted as the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) that 
same year. The HADEP party had its members arrested in 1996 when they lowered the 
Turkish flag and raised the PKK flag in Congress.194 The party continued to survive until 
2003, though, when it was also banned by the Constitutional Court on grounds of 
supporting the PKK.195 The Democratic People’s Party succeeded the HADEP, having 
been founded in 1997 following the HADEP’s legal troubles. The Democratic People’s 
Party later merged to form the Democratic Society Party (DTP).196 The DTP was banned 
in 2009 and became the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which in 2014 was 
succeeded by the HDP.197 All this is to say that it appears the PKK has already made 
attempts to politicize. Turkish administrators certainly believe so, having banned each 
subsequent pro-Kurdish political party on grounds of being affiliated with the PKK.198 
Similarly, pro-Kurdish party leaders have alluded to their links to the PKK. The former 
DTP leader, Aysel Tugluk, responded when asked about links to the organization, “of 
course these people can influence our policies. You should not see the PKK as composed 
of 5,000–7,000 fighters but rather as a political entity in Turkey.”199 
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If these accusations are to be believed, then the first time a pro-Kurdish political 
party affiliated with the PKK ran for political office in Turkey was the 1995 election 
where the People’s Democracy Party received 4 percent of the vote.200 This was below 
the 10 percent required in Turkey to win a Member of Parliament seat, but the coinciding 
reduction in PKK violence following 1995 is undeniable (Figure 21). This further 
validates the analysis’s theory that politicization reduces violence significantly. 
Since the recent election of Turkish parliament in which the HDP won 80 seats 
and the increase in Turkish military airstrikes against the PKK under the guise of sorties 
attacking ISIS, violence levels have begun to rise.201 Turkish strikes on Kurdish 
insurgent camps in Iraq were conducted in response to an attack by the PKK where two 
Turkish soldiers were killed and four were wounded.202 The opportunity to conduct 
attacks against its decades-old threat was realized by Turkey after having been “a 
reluctant member of the U.S.-led coalition against Islamic State,” and making “a dramatic 
turnaround…by granting the alliance access to its air bases and launching air raids 
against both the jihadist movement and the PKK.”203 These reciprocated attacks threaten 
to once again cause negotiations between the PKK and Turkey to falter, potentially 
derailing the recent progress that has been made. 
D. PROLIFERATION 
This convoluted situation causes Turkey to risk impelling the PKK to coordinate 
with its more violence-oriented neighboring Kurdish organizations. Turkey has alleged 
that the PKK is colluding with ISIS, but this seems unlikely considering the Democratic 
Union Party (PYD), a PKK affiliate, is actively fighting ISIS in Syria.204 Nevertheless, 
this could potentially be a proliferation issue because the PKK’s influence extends well 
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beyond the borders of Turkey. Turkey has already entangled other countries in its internal 
struggle against the PKK due to neighboring countries not prosecuting potential PKK 
collaborators adequately. For example, Turkey attempted to stifle German endeavors to 
prosecute a “suspected Iranian nuclear smuggler who had been arrested in Turkey…in 
violation of a United Nations Security Council embargo on assistance to an Iranian 
reactor that could make weapons-grade plutonium,” because of Germany’s failure to 
sufficiently prosecute PKK affiliates within its borders.205 Mark Hibbs, a Carnegie 
columnist, assessed that Turkey did this because of Iranian influence, and lack of German 
PKK extraditions.206 Regardless of the reason, Turkey’s actions show that even though it 
is negotiating with the PKK, it still maintains a hardline stance against them and will not 
hesitate to hold a vendetta for a perceived slight at the detriment of international security. 
That said, the likelihood that the PKK would want to obtain a nuclear weapon is 
low. The mere hint of anything regarding nuclear proliferation and the PKK would set the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party back forty years’ worth of work toward their ultimate goal. 
This in itself is enough of a deterrent for the PKK to even consider obtaining a nuclear 
weapon as long as negotiations are still going well. If negotiations deteriorate, however, it 
is not outside the realm of possibility for the PKK to work with either Iran, other violent 
non-state actors, or one of its affiliates to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. This is 
an important reason why the United States should attempt to influence a successful PKK 
disarmament and transition to politics. The PKK continues to make genuine efforts to 
achieve their goal through peaceful negotiation. Several legitimate states, though, 
including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Turkey 
among others, have labeled the PKK as a terrorist organization and have supported action 
against the group for decades. Due to its identification as a terrorist organization, the 
PKK is not encouraged to act legitimately thus pushing them to interact with other violent 
non-state actors. Therefore, the subject of PKK counter-proliferation cannot be 
dismissed. 
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Since Turkey is a NATO member and an important U.S. ally in the Middle East 
region the U.S. government has supported Turkish efforts against the PKK.207 Such 
covert action, though, complicates matters for the United States when dealing with 
another close ally—the Kurds in northern Iraq. This group is not only ethnically tied to 
the PKK, but the United States also draws heavily from its ranks to combat the current 
threat in the region from ISIS. So, it is difficult for the United States to both support its 
NATO ally Turkey and the Kurds in Iraq. In order to prevent either U.S. ally from feeling 
alienated it is critically important to encourage the PKK to politicize within Turkey. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Combatting violent non-state actors that are seeking to politicize perpetuates 
violence, but completing negotiations and giving these same actors a political voice has 
been demonstrated to significantly reduce the violence. Influencing these types of 
organizations through means of diplomacy, and helping them to achieve their goals 
within their respective countries’ borders, will not only deescalate international 
involvement in combat operations abroad, but also mitigate the export of their violence. 
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party is no exception, and in fact, it is currently the world’s 
foremost candidate for transitioning to political action. Turkey’s incorporation of the 
PKK into politics would reduce the likelihood of continued violence in a grand, or even 
potentially WMD, scale. In the case of the PKK, where negotiators are requesting third-
party arbitrators, legitimate state actors would be prudent to support a transition by 
intervening and acting as an authoritative intermediary. Doing so could avert any 
inclination the PKK may have to stopping the negotiation process and continue to 
conduct violent attacks or support other international violent non-state actors. It is this 
analysis’s prediction that the PKK will politicize. Turkey’s continued attacks against the 
PKK in lieu of fighting ISIS, however, indicate that the government is not yet willing to 
fully support politicization. With a third-party arbitrator the negotiation process would 
perhaps be expedited and legitimized. 
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VI. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (EGYPT): TRANSITION 
FAILURE 
Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, more commonly known as the Muslim Brotherhood, is 
considered a failed politicization by this analysis’s definitions.208 Dealing specifically 
with Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood began, it started out as a charitable religious 
organization, became a violent non-state actor, and then became a politically motivated 
transnational group. The group gained considerable influence throughout the Arab region 
and Europe, and was eventually elected to the Presidency in Egypt following the “Arab 
Spring.” Upon the Muslim Brotherhood’s removal from office, the organization in Egypt 
moved back to violence. This chapter focuses specifically on the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood division, where the organization was founded, and where it achieved 
politicization and then by some accounts moved back to terrorism, becoming outlawed by 
the new Egyptian government.209 Having already examined case studies of politicization 
success, and politicization transition, it is also necessary to assess a case of politicization 
failure. This organization began as a social program with political aspirations, sought 
recognition through violence, came to power democratically, and moved back to 
violence. Equally important as an examination of conditions that influence politicization 
is a consideration for conditions that may lead to politicization’s eventual failure. 
While not designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United 
States, the Muslim Brotherhood is considered a violent non-state actor by Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia the United Arab Emirates, and Russia among others.210 Additionally, a bill was 
recently submitted to the United States Congress to designate the Brotherhood as an 
FTO.211 The bill did not receive enough support for ratification, but its proposal and the 
FTO designation by other nation states indicates the current sentiment toward the 
primarily socio-political organization. The Brotherhood in Egypt differs in this respect 
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from the previous case studies analyzed. While its history demonstrates it is mainly a 
socio-political entity, the Brotherhood has had violent tendencies at various times during 
its history. As such, many legitimate states and influential leaders currently consider the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt a violent non-state actor, and the forefather to similar 
groups throughout the region. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Muslim Brotherhood was “founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-
Banna.”212 It began as a community service social movement, functioning as a counter to 
Arab secularism. Its tenets are simple, the Muslim Brotherhood espouses to stand for 
traditional Sunni Islamic ideals.213 Early on, al-Banna emphasized Egyptian sovereignty, 
denigrating the moral, economic, and political sway of Western government’s 
influence.214 The organization desired Shari’a law implemented by way of popular 
support achieved through a religious revitalization.215 
The ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood quickly spread under al-Banna’s 
charismatic leadership. In 20 years, it grew from just seven people, to over two thousand 
different branches throughout Egypt, with an estimated 300,000 to 600,000 members.216 
It also became transnational, with the Egyptian division being the “mother” organization 
for similar groups in Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Bahrain, and a model 
emulated in northern African revivalist groups.217 The various branches each had, and 
still have, different personalities and slightly different views on certain issues. In 
particular, the balance between politics, social reform, and violence to achieve the 
organization’s aims varies. 
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In the late 1930s, the first militant wing of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
emerged.218 Beginning a practice repeated throughout its existence, the organization 
exported violence through this “special section” sending three battalions to fight in the 
Palestine War in 1948.219 The “special section” also conducted weapons and tactics 
training at home. Later that same year they assassinated a prominent Egyptian judge and 
the Prime Minister. In retaliation, government agents gunned down al-Banna.220 
From 1954 to 1970, the Brotherhood, under new leadership, and the Nasser 
regime remained at odds. President Nasser dissolved the organization in 1954, forcing 
them underground, and they tried to assassinate him later that year for concessions he 
made to British security interests.221 Nasser responded by imprisoning hundreds of 
Brotherhood leaders and hanging six prominent Society members.222 While this nearly 
decimating the Brotherhood for a time, it also influenced a radicalization in thought. 
Sayyid Qutb, now a famous martyr for the Islamic cause, wrote about the Brotherhood 
ideology from an Egyptian jail extolling followers to prepare for jihad in an effort to 
“establish a system based on the laws of God.”223 While some senior Brotherhood 
leaders emphasized that it was possible for Muslims “live their lives in conformity with 
the laws of God even in the absence of an Islamic state,” a radical element of the 
Brotherhood’s original religious charity intent had developed and gained strength due to 
Nasser’s suppression.224 Mustafa Shukri also developed his brand of militant 
Brotherhood while imprisoned. The splinter group he formed, Jama’at al-Jihad, was 
behind the assassination of President Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat in 1981.225 
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After Nasser died in 1970 and was succeeded by Sadat, the regime’s relationship 
with the Brotherhood seemed to be on the verge of changing. President Sadat courted 
many of the Islamic ideals the Brotherhood championed in an effort to consolidate his 
power and counterweight his predecessor’s leftist leanings.226 Sadat even offered to 
register the Brotherhood as an association under the Ministry of Social Affairs, however 
the organization at the time wished to form a legitimate political party.227 Sadat rejected 
this idea. In 1976, however, six members of the Brotherhood were elected to parliament, 
having running un-affiliated.228 The organization was attempting to “work within the 
framework of existing laws and institutions in order to transform them.”229 By 1981 the 
tacit alliance with Sadat had all but ended. The organization increasingly criticized the 
regime, particularly Sadat signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, and Sadat’s 
tolerance for dissent had waned. He arrested over 1,500 civic political leaders, including 
al-Tilmisani, the Brotherhood Supreme Guide, and many other influential Brothers, 
saying he would not “tolerate those who try to tamper with the high interest of the state 
under the guise of religion.”230 It was during this time period that the Brotherhood was 
able to revitalize the organization through its affiliation with the Islamic student 
movement.231 
Under Hosni Mubarak’s presidency, this new generation of Brotherhood members 
began to bring the group to politics despite that fact that it was still an illegal 
organization.232 When Mubarak succeeded Sadat, his crack down on the Brotherhood 
forced many radicalized militant members to flee Egypt.233 This allowed more moderate 
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members to lead the organization away from violence in the more open political climate 
established by the Mubarak’s regime.234 In 1984, the Brotherhood aligned with a secular 
nationalist party and gained eight parliamentary seats. Aligning with the socialist and 
liberal parties in 1987, the organization won thirty-six seats making it the largest 
opposition group in the government.235 The Brotherhood boycotted the 1990 election, but 
in 1995 they put forward 170 independent candidates. In response to criticisms of being 
co-opted into a system that did not uphold Shari’a edicts, al-Tilmisani explained: 
Our goal is not what you would call a political victory but rather what 
concerns us is achieving a victory for God and the application of his Law, 
hence if we entered parliament, we don’t consider this a victory according 
to the criteria of other people; rather we consider it a minbar (pulpit) 
which is capable of spreading the da’wa of God…our entry into 
parliament is not a goal in and of itself but rather a means, and if one 
strategy does not succeed, we will abandon it and seek out another 
strategy.236 
Despite the Brotherhood’s moderation and politicization, a major generational rift 
remained between the rank and file Muslim Brotherhood members and the older 
leadership. Al-Tilmisani and his successor Hamid Abu Nasr continued to emphasize that 
the organization favored the gradual application of Shari’a law.237 But the electoral 
mandates given by increasing political success emboldened many Brotherhood members. 
As they learned the governmental system the Brotherhood deputies began to “justify their 
efforts to secure a larger role in the political system, as well as to expedite the application 
of Shari’a, by referring to the principles of democracy, citizenship, and the rule of 
law.”238 For example, the 1990 electoral “boycott was not a withdrawal from the system, 
but rather a protest against the government’s attempts to decrease the Brotherhood’s 
presence in the People’s Assembly.”239 These middle-generation Brothers, who came to 
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be known as the reformist, had become professional syndicate and political leaders 
entrenching themselves into every aspect of Egyptian public life. This clash of ideas 
between the old guard and reformist amounted to a belief by the newer generation in 
“democracy and pluralism of ideas,” at least inasmuch as it advanced the Brotherhood’s 
influence and agenda.240 
The early years of Mubarak’s rule allowed the Brotherhood to become engrained 
in the system, without technically being recognized as part of the system. For example, 
the Brotherhood’s quick humanitarian-relief-effort reaction to the 1992 Cairo earthquake 
prompted the minister of interior to comment, “Do we have a state within a state?”241 
This realization also prompted the regime’s efforts to regain control, however. First a law 
was passed that would “prevent an organized minority from dominating the syndicates 
for its own political ends.”242 Arrests began to put some of the Brotherhood’s most 
effective leadership behind bars. Underscoring the regime’s position, President Mubarak 
remarked in 1994 that, “this whole problem of terrorism throughout the Middle East is a 
by product of our own illegal Muslim Brotherhood…they say that they renounce 
violence, by in reality they are responsible for all the violence.”243 
In the years before the Egyptian uprising, the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to 
balance being the largest, most well organized opposition to the regime, with still being 
an illegal organization that needed to refrain from drawing the administration’s 
attention.244 They avoided flexing their political might too much in elections to prevent 
undue attention and they continued to learn the political and socio-economic systems. 
Nevertheless, they remained the “largest opposition bloc winning 88 seats [in] the 2005 
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parliamentary elections.”245 As a result, when the uprising occurred on January 25, 2011, 
the Brotherhood was uniquely positioned as the most powerful, best-organized civilian 
entity in Egypt. 
By February 11th, President Mubarak had offered his resignation. During the 
eighteen days of protests the Brotherhood had carefully encouraged the movement, 
knowing if it failed they would be blamed by the regime, while trying to prevent 
appearing like they were exploiting the situation.246 A few short months later, on May 
18, 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood became a legitimate political party.247 The political 
wing they established, called the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), claiming to be non-
theocratic, won an astonishing 43 percent of the parliamentary seats.248 A FJP member 
was also elected Speaker of the House, and of the nineteen parliament committees, 
twelve went to FJP leaders.249 Months later, Muhammad Mursi was inaugurated as 
Egypt’s first democratically elected president on June 30, 2012.250 
The Muslim Brotherhood appeared to be firmly established as the new power 
broker in Egypt. But, a mere year after Mursi’s inauguration protests erupted calling for 
him to step down as president. On July 3, 2013 the military forcibly removed him from 
office, and by December the Muslim Brotherhood was again declared “a terrorist 
organization by the Egyptian government.”251 The FJP was banned, financial assets were 
seized, Brotherhood media outlets were shut down, and over three thousand Brotherhood 
leaders were detained.252 
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Following this crackdown, the Brotherhood appears to have rediscovered its 
violent roots. In 2013 and early 2014 the Brotherhood conducted more attacks than at any 
point in the Egyptian Brotherhood’s existence since its early inception. It appears that the 
group fully politicized, was in fact the largest and strongest party in Egypt, and has now 
regressed back to a violent non-state actor. 
B. CONDITIONS 
By examining the conditions of the Muslim Brotherhood, there may be some 
indication of what factors were lacking. This chapter will analyze negotiations, the 
ideology of the organization, motivations, target selection, and the longevity of the 
Muslim Brotherhood to determine if its conditions suggested a failure to politicize. Or 
conversely, that politicization is likely to occur again in the future under more favorable 
conditions. 
Negotiations occurred between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian 
government on numerous occasions. Early in Sadat’s regime al-Tilmisani met with the 
administration to broach the idea of the Muslim Brotherhood forming a political party.253 
These “negotiations” ended with Sadat refusing to allow the Brotherhood as a political 
party, but inviting them into the Ministry of Social Affairs where the administration 
would have control over them. Al-Tilmisani strategically rejected this alternative so that 
the Brotherhood could to continue to increase its base support through both social service 
activities and political influence without government oversight.254 
Similarly, the Brotherhood leadership was invited to participate in shaping the 
country’s future by President Mubarak following the 2011 uprising in an attempt to quell 
the revolution.255 These talks occurred under like circumstances, the regime was again 
looking to consolidate power and attempted to negotiate with the Brotherhood in order to 
gain popular support. 
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In both of these circumstances, however, the Brotherhood was not encouraged to 
politicize. In fact, quite the opposite, the regime wanted to use the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
popular support to its advantage without having to deal with the organization as a 
political entity that might threaten it. So, while negotiations did occur, instead of 
stimulating politicization or moderation, the Brotherhood was incentivized to remain 
apart from the regime. By remaining an illegal organization not tied to the administration 
the Brotherhood was tacitly allowed to continue to grow its capabilities and base support. 
In sum, the negotiations that occurred did not offer the Muslim Brotherhood any benefits 
in exchange for politicizing. Instead of attempting to leverage the Brotherhood from a 
position of power or stalemate, the Egyptian administration negotiated from a position of 
weakness, whereby all the Brotherhood had to do was wait in order to gain better 
footing.256 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology is religious. This means the probability of 
them politicizing is extremely low.257 Their history implies it may not be as improbable 
as the numbers would indicate, though. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had an almost 
50-year lull in violence where the organization concentrated on politics and 
socioeconomic programs. It is telling that during this time period the majority of the 
Brotherhood’s moderation and restructuring occurred. When the group professed liberal 
leftist ideas of democratization and participated in the administration, whether for its own 
selfish benefit or because it actually believed the ideology is debated, many Brothers did 
moderate their views.258 The implementation of Shari’a law was emphasized as a gradual 
progression that would, in the Brotherhood’s viewpoint, be called for by the people.259 
This softening of the organization’s religious stance, as well as the pragmatism indicated 
by the group’s willingness to form coalitions without regard for religion, imply a less 
hardline religious stance than initially inferred. 
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From a motivational or goal standpoint, the Brotherhood desires policy change. 
Their ultimate goal is to institute Shari’a law and an Islamic revitalization within 
Egypt.260 Typically policy change oriented violent non-state actors have a high 
probability of politicizing. Although the Brotherhood’s policy-change goal may seem 
drastic to some, the Egyptian parliamentary voting following the Arab spring 
demonstrated widespread support for hardline Islamist. The FJP party and Islamic 
Alliance, composed of a conglomeration of Salafi candidates, comprised 68 percent of 
the total votes.261 This indicates that the Brotherhood’s overarching policy goal is 
consistent with the average Egyptian constituent’s belief system, and their religious 
ideology is likely a draw rather than a hindrance to politicization due to the country’s 
overall predisposition. With regard to target selection the data is somewhat incomplete 
due to the timeframe of the database. The majority of the Muslim Brotherhood’s violence 
was committed prior to 1968, which this data does not encapsulate. Considering the 
known targets of the Brotherhood in the 1940s and 1950s, however, it is clear that 
government-related attacks dominated. This is consistent with a group that politicizes and 
is also consistent with the organization’s attack ratio following their removal from the 
administration. Since Mursi was deposed, the Brotherhood has conducted 22 attacks. Of 
those, 13 have been government-related while only 8 have been civilian-related 
targets.262 This indicates that the Muslim Brotherhood had a high likelihood of 
politicizing early on in its existence and has maintained that probability for the majority 
of its existence. Even following its recent designation as a terrorist organization by the 
Egyptian government the Muslim Brotherhood’s target selection continues to indicate a 
likelihood of politicizing. 
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Figure 22.  Muslim Brotherhood Government-related Targets 
 





Figure 23.  Muslim Brotherhood Civilian-related Targets 
  








Considering that the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is the “mother” 
branch of a larger transnational organization and has exported a lot of its violence it may 
prove useful to analyze the group in its entirety. When analyzing the transnational 
Muslim Brotherhood organization the same trend occurs. The Muslim Brotherhood 
targeted 66 government-related targets while attacking only 48 civilian-related targets, 
with the spike in 1979 resulting from the Syrian branch conflict.263 
Figure 24.  Muslim Brotherhood International Government-related Targets 
  




Last, the Muslim Brotherhood’s longevity is also consistent with a group that 
politicizes. It has existed since 1928, for over 8 decades. It is also a hierarchical 
organization that has demonstrated resiliency and longevity through multiple regimes and 
                                                 







multiple countries.264 Some Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaders have encouraged 
politicization more than others, but the longevity of the organization and democratization 
of its structure indicates that politicization is likely to occur again. 
C. VIOLENCE LEVELS 
For the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, an analysis of its path to politicization is 
complex. Technically the first time affiliated Muslim Brotherhood members ran for office 
was after the Arab Spring in 2011. In reality, though, the first time the Muslim 
Brotherhood allowed unofficially affiliated members to run for political office was in 
1976. These members ran for office buoyed by, and touting, their Brotherhood 
membership. So, despite the organization still being illegal at that time their political 
representation was tacitly allowed. 
Considering this second date as the real date of politicization for the Muslim 
Brotherhood yields similar results to our statistical analysis and previous case studies. 
Following their initial violence after inception the Muslim Brotherhood had a long period 
of non-violence in Egypt. From 1968 to 2014 the organization conducted a total of 27 
incidents.265 One attack was in 1991 and the remaining 26 attacks occurred after the 
Brotherhood was removed from power and designated a terrorist organization.266 If 
Figure 25 depicted the Muslim Brotherhood’s earliest attacks, the trend would be 
consistent with other politicized organizations. There was an almost complete lack of 
attack activity following the Brotherhood’s politicization. That non-violent tendency 
remained throughout the years of the organizations participation in the administration, 
and then ceased following its removal from the government. The only difference between 
the Muslim Brotherhood and other politicized violent non-state actors is the resumption 
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of violence following its removal from the administration. Some of the recent violence 
attributed to the Brotherhood by the Egyptian government is in dispute. This database 
only accounts for violence that can directly be connected to the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Figure 25.  Muslim Brotherhood Egyptian Targets 
 






The conditions considered in this chapter indicate that it is likely that the Muslim 
Brotherhood will politicize again. It does seem improbable in the near future, though. The 
current Egyptian government has destroyed much of the infrastructure and leadership of 
the Brotherhood. Former President Mursi was given a life sentence in 2015 and 
“convicted of conspiring to commit terrorist acts with foreign organizations to undermine 
national security.”267 His sixteen co-defendants were sentenced to death for “leaking 
state secrets to a foreign state.” Prosecutors accused the Brotherhood of exporting 
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violence and terrorism by sending members to military training camps run by Hamas, 
Hizbollah, and Iran. They also blamed the Brotherhood for creating the instability that 
lead to the 2011 revolution.268 In the backlash to their short democratic rule, hundreds of 
Muslim Brotherhood members were killed and the leadership imprisoned.269 
So, under the current administration it is likely the Muslim Brotherhood will not 
politicize and may continue to be persecuted and stymied. But if the organization 
survives, which its transnational ties and influence make probable, it will surely attempt 
to politicize again in the future under more favorable administrative conditions. In fact, 
the Muslim Brotherhood issued statements earlier this year explaining that, “the group 
has remained, and still remains, committed—in word and deed—to peaceful and political 
civil resistance.”270 The statement continued, “Those who choose a violent path no 
longer belong in the Brotherhood, and the group no longer accepts them.”271 More 
recently, following the alleged execution of nine Muslim Brotherhood leaders in a raid by 
the administration, the Brotherhood has called for the people to “Come out in rebellion 
and in defense of your country…[and] destroy the citadels of his oppression and tyranny 
and reclaim Egypt once more.”272 The Muslim Brotherhood statement went on to say the 
attack was, “a turning point that will have its own repercussions…el-Sissi is initiating a 
new phase during which it will not be possible to control the anger of the oppressed 
sectors.”273 The Egyptian administration continues to target the Muslim Brotherhood, but 
the Brotherhood’s leadership appears divided on the use of force. 
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The case of the Muslim Brotherhood reiterates an important trend. Violent non-
state actors that politicize tend to either moderate or fail. In the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
case Mursi refused to moderate in order to preserve his constituency, so the organization 
failed and was removed from power. In the case of the Irish Republican Army, they 
moderated and Sinn Fein remains a powerful political entity in both the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland. In Hizbollah’s case the organization has reduced their 
violence and also looks to be moderating in order to maintain their political authority. 
The PKK moderates and minimizes attacks during periodic ceasefires, seeking 
politicization. Turkey’s continued attacks against the group prompt retaliatory violence, 
however, as well as jeopardize a successful PKK political transition. The pendulum of 
moderation and violent action continues to swing. Violent groups typically have hardline 
stances. When those positions are not adjusted to more accurately reflect mainstream 
voters upon politicization, organizations fail. With the Muslim Brotherhood being the 
largest representative party following the 2011 uprising, their failure to adapt quickly 
from an opposition group mentality to a leader in need of coalition and majority support, 
resulted in swift condemnation. Democratized but not liberalized in their positions, the 
Brotherhood was “rightly blamed for much of the social polarization and institutional 
dysfunction that plagued Egypt’s transition.”274 
Muslim Brotherhood is transnational, therefore it is unlikely that the organization 
will simply disappear. They will continue to remain a prominent non-state actor within 
Egypt and the region. The real question is if the violence perpetuated by the organization 
will increase or cease, and if they will attempt to politicize again. The Islamic State Sinai 
affiliate has stepped up attacks recently and the Egyptian administration continues to 
target both them and the Brotherhood equally blaming many attacks on the Brotherhood. 
This analysis indicates that politicization is probable, although not under the current 
administration. 
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VII. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis combined quantitative and qualitative methods to examine factors 
that influence a violent non-state actor’s transition from violence to politics. The 
statistical analysis was able to determine five factors that are significant in regards to 
politicization. Additionally, through a sampling of case studies, the violence levels 
following “politicization” were shown to significantly decrease. This demonstrates that 
certain violent non-state actors are predisposed to politicization and, furthermore, once an 
organization moves to politics its violence levels decrease. Admittedly, the complete 
transition of a violent non-state actor from violence to political action can sometimes 
occur extremely slowly. It is important, however, to recognize that once politicization 
begins, whether it succeeds or fails, violence decreases. As such, it would behoove 
legitimate states to closely examine the conditions its violent non-state actors exist in, and 
whenever possible attempt to encourage politicization. Moreover, violent non-state actors 
that politicize but do not moderate tend to fail. This alludes to supplementary benefits of 
encouraging politicization: regardless of the outcome for the violent non-state actor the 
state will become more secure. Either the violent non-state actor will moderate and 
reduce violence, or the organization will politically fail, which will result in a decline of 
its perceived legitimacy among its supporters. This chapter: summarizes the analysis’s 
findings with regard to conditions and violence levels; discusses the implications of those 
findings; recommends the United States’ role in encouraging politicization; and 
recommends areas of additional research. 
A. CONDITIONS 
 This analysis quantitatively examined: regime type, economy, size, negotiations, 
ideology, motivations, target selection, and the longevity of violent non-state actors. It 
was determined that five of the eight factors had significance with respect to the 
propensity of an organization to politicize. Negotiations, ideology, motivations, target 
selection, and a group’s longevity all had varying degrees of impact on a transition to 
political action. 
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The commencement of negotiations is one of the most important indicators of 
politicization. To reiterate, after a violent non-state actor has shown some degree of 
longevity, entering into negotiations will often facilitate a decline.275 Most groups do not 
enter into talks; in fact, only one in five violent non-state actors negotiate on strategic 
issues.276 Of those that do enter into talks, an astonishing nine out of ten succeed.277 This 
demonstrates that getting a violent non-state actor to the negotiating table is perhaps the 
most prominent factor in encouraging politicization. This can be enabled and promoted 
by the state by having a third-party arbiter to add legitimacy and accountability to the 
negotiations process. 
Ideology was shown to be significant, but in the case study analyses every 
organization studied was a statistical anomaly. This is evidence of, as Rapoport 
explained, the evolving nature of today’s violent non-state actors.278 More and more 
violent non-state actors are utilizing religious principles as justification for their 
grievances; so, perhaps a religious ideology is becoming less significant in predicting an 
organization’s durability or ending type. More overtly, it shows that while each of the 
five factors are important indicators of politicization, a combination of factors impacts 
the overall move away from violence more than any one condition. 
A violent non-state actor’s actual motivations are not always readily apparent. 
States must attempt to frame an organization’s grievances into manageable and 
negotiable parameters. This analysis demonstrates that policy, regime, and territorial 
change goals are the most likely to politicize. Often a violent non-state actor’s goals are a 
combination of issues. If the state agrees to discuss certain aspects of a violent non-state 
actor’s goals via potential policy, regime, or territorial changes the probability of 
politicization becomes much higher. Additionally, this increases the likelihood of 
convincing a violent non-state actor to negotiate. 
                                                 
275 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 35. 
276 Ibid., 36. 
277 Ibid., 41. 
278 Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror,” 47. 
 95 
Target selection was also shown to be extremely important when it comes to a 
group’s propensity to politicize. Every case of successful politicization is a violent non-
state actor who attacked “government-related” targets more than “civilian” ones.279 The 
case study analysis demonstrates that there is a wide range of variation with respect to 
target type; however, a group that predominantly targets civilians has never politicized. 
Analyzing an organization’s target trends displays indications of “politicization ripeness.” 
An organization may begin its lifespan with primarily civilian-related targets and move to 
government-related targets later. As government-related targeting increases and civilian-
related targeting decreases, a group becomes more discriminatory in its target selection. 
This is a clear indication that the group is becoming more concerned with public opinion 
and perception. An organization is ripe for a move toward politics when government-
related targeting peak in comparison to civilian attacks. 
Longevity was determined to be a significant factor, but because there is a wide 
variation with respect to politicization it is important not to weigh this factor too heavily. 
Violent non-state actors that have existed for long periods of time have obviously 
remained relevant enough to maintain some base of popular support. This likely means 
the group’s grievances are germane to at least some portion of the state’s population. 
However, this does not always indicate a likelihood to politicize. Longevity remains an 
important factor when combined with additional encouraging conditions. Without 
contributing politicization stimulating conditions, it is not as substantial. Specifically, the 
longevity of an organization should be considered when contemplating negotiations 
because there is a direct correlation between longevity and negotiations facilitating a 
violent non-state actor’s decline.280 
In summary, the factors of negotiations and target type are critical when it comes 
to predicting politicization. Longevity and ideology are important in combination with 
other factors. Similarly, an organization’s goals should attempt to be framed by the state 
into one of the three categories that yield positive politicization results. 
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B. VIOLENCE LEVELS 
It is clear that politicization, the first time an organization actively participates in 
the political apparatus of its host nation, reduces violence. By analyzing violence levels 
before and after politicization, in just a limited number of case studies, this analysis 
demonstrated a drastic change in violence following politicization. Even in ongoing 
conflicts, a violent non-state actor experimenting in politics reduced violence levels. The 
effect of a transition to politics is either moderation or failure with a corresponding 
reduction in violence being the end result in either case. 
A violent non-state actor’s shift from violence to politics takes time to 
materialize, but a group’s initial participation in government marks a significant point in 
that transition. By participating in the very administration a violent non-state actor is 
fighting they are both acknowledging that government’s legitimacy and beginning to 
stake a claim in it. It becomes significantly harder for a group to continue to protest and 
attack a government that it is a member of. This reveals a critical shift in the mindset of a 
violent non-state actor organization. Furthermore, it validates the necessity to accurately 
evaluate organizations based upon the factors that influence a group’s transition to 
politics. Accurate evaluations lead to precise resource allocations and influencing 
politicization when applicable, which, in turn, creates reduced violence levels. The 
violence reduction following politicization is the most striking aspect of this analysis’s 
findings. 
C. PREDICTIVITY 
This analysis can be used predictively to determine how a country can best invest 
its blood and treasure. By first determining the likelihood of an organization politicizing, 
a legitimate state actor can evaluate and gauge the manner in which it interacts with a 
group. While targeting is certainly always an option, it is also a vastly overused tool. It is 
this analysis’s position that violent non-state actors are frequently pushed to seek power 
and legitimacy via aggression, when they could instead be encouraged to move to 
political action. The same statistical tools utilized to examine politicization can also be 
used to determine salient factors for the other violent non-state actor ending types: 
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policing, military, victory, splintering, and victory. Used as a policy tool, this type of 
statistical analysis can estimate the chances for success before any investment in troops, 
money, or political capital is made. It can assist in making an informed decision 
regarding military, police action, or perhaps simply influencing a host nation to negotiate 
instead. In the United States’ current resource constrained environment, this type of 
consideration is imperative to maintaining the balance between international involvement 
and political maneuvering. 
D. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research is needed in a few areas in order to further validate this analysis’s 
findings. With regard to violence levels, a limited number of case studies were utilized to 
determine violence before and after politicization. More case studies could either refute 
those findings or further validate them. Additionally, other factors may also prove salient 
to politicization. For example, media influence is a likely candidate for a strong 
relationship to violence levels and politicization.281 Similarly, a location map of 
politicizations may indicate certain areas of the world that are more likely to politicize 
than others. 
E. UNITED STATES’ ROLE 
The factors discussed in this analysis can, and should, be influenced. A legitimate 
state can sway a violent non-state actor’s propensity to politicize in the same manner it 
may target them via military action. For example, in today’s highly digitally-connected 
world, a violent non-state actor’s perception of their degree of popular support can be 
manipulated. This could be used to convince a violent non-state actor to come to the 
negotiation table and possibly to politicize based upon a perceived amount of public 
support. As previously discussed, this leads to an organization either moderating or 
failing. The United States can assist its allies through material, intelligence, cyber, and/or 
arbitration support with respect to influencing politicization. 
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Negotiations can be encouraged and prompted through powerful third-party 
intervention and adjudication. The United States could have a strong impact in this realm, 
as President Clinton did in negotiations in Northern Ireland. Because negotiations play 
such an enormous role in inducing politicization it would behoove the United States to 
act as an arbitrator when possible. A third-party arbitrator adds a level of legitimacy and 
accountability to negotiations between a state and a violent non-state actor. An arbitrator 
that is a world leader sends a message as to the status of such negotiations, and an 
outside-actor arbitrator is often seen as holding both parties accountable. In cases where 
United States entanglements with the country or violent non-state actor prohibit direct 
arbitration involvement, the United States could influence an ally to facilitate talks. 
Hierarchical organization can also be encouraged. Persistent targeting forces 
violent non-state actors to decentralize and encourages a cellular structuring in order to 
survive.282 Conversely, some degree of monitored freedom of movement and 
communication, in a violent non-state actor targeted for politicization, will influence a 
hierarchical structure.283 Similarly, pragmatic leadership can be influenced through 
discriminant decapitation techniques. This can also be influenced via social media 
campaigning or other population support influence measures. If the leader of a violent 
non-state actor in a hierarchical organization is completely opposed to politicization, but 
other conditions favor a move to political action, steps should be taken to effect a change 
in leadership. 
Even target discrimination could be manipulated via the media emphasizing 
civilian casualties when they occur from a violent non-state actor’s operations. An 
emphasis on civilian casualties would potentially make the group more risk adverse and 
discriminant in their targeting. Target discrimination for a violent non-state actor makes 
operations more difficult and, as evidenced, more government-related attacks indicate a 
group is more probable to politicize. There are, however, obviously second- and third-
order effects that must be considered in highlighting the effectiveness of an 
organization’s attacks, regardless if they are civilian or government related. That being 
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said, manipulating a violent non-state actor’s popular support due to lack of target 
discrimination could have significant effects on their durability. 
The United States should use statistical analyses like this one to evaluate a violent 
non-state actor prior to determining its method of engagement. Military force and high 
value targeting seem to have become the United States’ primary method of dealing with 
violent non-state actors. This analysis demonstrates that a thorough examination of 
factors surrounding an organization needs to be conducted prior to engagement in order 
to determine the likelihood of ending violence via political means. If the probability of 
doing so is high, the United States would be able to save blood and treasure by 
attempting to influence a transition from violence to politics. 
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